Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 29
Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Angela Howard, Karolina
Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 29, 6:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces made marginal gains around Bakhmut on November 29, but Russian
forces remain unlikely to have advanced at the tempo that Russian sources claimed.
Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made marginal advances southeast of Bakhmut but ISW
remains unable to confirm most other claimed gains around Bakhmut made since November 27.
Some
Russian milbloggers made unsubstantiated claims that Russian forces broke through the Ukrainian
defensive line south of Bakhmut along the T0513 highway to advance towards Chasiv Yar, which would
cut one of two remaining main Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Bakhmut, but
such claims are likely part of a continuing Russian information operation and are premature, as ISW
has previously assessed.
ISW continues to assess that the degraded Russian forces around Bakhmut
are unlikely to place Bakhmut under threat of imminent encirclement rapidly.
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 29 that Russian
forces have likely stopped deploying battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the past three
months.
The UK MoD stated that the BTGs‘ relatively low allocation of infantry, decentralized
distribution of artillery, and the limited independence of BTG decision-making hindered their success
in Ukraine.
ISW assessed starting in April that Russian BTGs were degraded in various failed or
culminated Russian offensives, including the attacks on Kyiv, Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and
Lysychansk, and later efforts to reconstitute these BTGs to restore their combat power have failed.
Russian forces have likely since thrown their remaining combat power and new personnel, including
mobilized personnel, into poorly trained, equipped, and organized ad hoc structures with low morale
and discipline.
The structure of BTGs and the way the Russian military formed them by breaking up
doctrinal battalions, regiments, and brigades likely deprived the Russians of the ability to revert to
doctrinal organizations, as ISW has previously assessed, so that the Russians must now rely on ad-hoc
structures with mobilized personnel.
Key Takeaways
• Russian forces made marginal gains around Bakhmut on November 29, but
Russian forces remain unlikely to have advanced at the tempo that Russian sources
claimed.
• The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces have
likely stopped deploying battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the past three months,
supporting ISW’s prior assessments.
• Russian forces continued to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations
around Svatove as Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations
around Svatove and Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks west of Kreminna to regain lost
positions.
