Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, and Frederick W.
Kagan
November 12, 7:30 ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson City is igniting an ideological fracture between pro-
war figures and Russian President Vladimir Putin, eroding confidence in Putin’s
commitment and ability to deliver his war promises. A pro-war Russian ideologist, Alexander
Dugin, openly criticized Putin—whom he referred to as the autocrat—for failing to uphold Russian
ideology by surrendering Kherson City on November 12.
Dugin said this Russian ideology defines
Russia’s responsibility to defend “Russian cities” such as Kherson, Belgorod, Kursk, Donetsk, and
Simferopol. Dugin noted that an autocrat has a responsibility to save his nation all by himself or face
the fate of “king of the rains,” a reference to Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough in which a king was
killed because he was unable to deliver rain amidst a drought. Dugin also downplayed the role of Putin’s
advisors in failing to protect the Russian world and noted that the commander of Russian Forces in
Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin was not responsible for the political decision to withdraw from
Kherson City. Dugin noted that the autocrat cannot repair this deviation from ideology merely with
public appearances, noting that “the authorities in Russia cannot surrender anything else” and that “the
limit has been reached.” He also accused the presidential administration of upholding a “fake” ideology
because of its fear of committing to the “Russian Idea.” Dugin also made a reference to the use of tactical
nuclear weapons, which he vaguely stated was “the end” and proceeded to note that overdue Russian
changes to the military campaign have not generated any effect to change the course of the war. He
also suggested, however, that Russia must commit to the Russian Idea rather than pursuing the “stupid”
use of nuclear weapons.
Putin is having a harder time appeasing parts of the highly ideological pro-war
constituency due to his military’s inability to deliver his maximalist goals of
overthrowing the Ukrainian government and seizing all of Ukraine, as ISW has
previously assessed.
Putin’s nationalist-leaning propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov are
increasingly demanding that the Kremlin and higher military command to fully commit to their goals
in Ukraine, and Solovyov even called for full mobilization and the firing of incompetent officials
following the Russian surrender of Kherson City.
Select milbloggers have previously criticized Putin
for his failure to respond to the attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on October 9, while others noted that
Putin has failed to uphold the ideology of Russian superiority since 2014.
Direct criticism of Putin
within the pro-war community is almost unprecedented, and Dugin’s high-profile and unhinged attack
on Putin may indicate a shift among the Russian nationalist ideologues.
Putin needs to retain the
support of this community and has likely ordered some of his propagandists to suppress any critiques
of the Russian withdrawal from Kherson City, since many state TV news programs have been omitting
or downplaying the aftermath of withdrawal.
The ever-increasing doubts among extreme
Russian nationalists about Putin’s commitment to Russian ideology reduce Putin’s
appeal to the nationalist community, while mobilization and high casualties will likely
continue to upset members of the Russian society.
