Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk,
and Mason Clark
November 8, 7:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Iranian state-run outlet Nour News Agency reported that Russian National
Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev arrived in Tehran on
November 8, likely to discuss the potential sale of Iranian ballistic missiles
to Russia.
Nour News Agency announced Patrushev’s arrival in an English-language
tweet, stating that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali
Shamkhani invited Patrushev and noted that Patrushev will also meet with other high-
ranking Iranian political and economic officials to discuss Russo-Iranian cooperation.
Nour News Agency is affiliated with the SNSC. The SNSC likely announced Patrushev’s
arrival in Iran to highlight the deepening cooperation between Moscow and Tehran to an
international audience (rather than domestically), as well as to implicitly highlight that a
high-ranking Russian official turned to Iran for help in Ukraine. Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani notably traveled to
Moscow in 2015 to appeal to Russia to intervene in the Syrian Civil War. Tehran is likely
eager to publicly signal this rebalancing of its strategic partnership with Moscow,
especially to regional Iranian adversaries with which the Kremlin occasionally cooperates,
such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Patrushev’s visit to Iran notably comes amid reports that
the Iranian regime is seeking Russian help with protest suppression, although it is unclear
if this will be discussed by Patrushev and his Iranian counterpart.
The Kremlin is continuing efforts to covertly acquire munitions for use in
Ukraine to mitigate the effects of international sanctions and backfill
Russia’s ongoing depletion of domestic munitions stockpiles. British outlet Sky
News reported on November 8 that the Kremlin flew 140 million euros in cash and a
selection of captured British-made NLAW anti-tank missiles, US-made Javelin anti-tank
missiles, and a Stinger anti-aircraft missile to Tehran on August 20 in exchange for 160
additional Shahed-136 drones for use in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center
reported on November 8 that Tehran continues to supply Moscow with Mohajer, Arash,
and Shahed-type drones by air and sea via both Iranian state-owned and privately-owned
entities.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center additionally reported that due to failures of
the Russian military-industrial complex, Russian military leaders are continuing their
efforts to procure dual-use (military and non-military use) goods such as computer chips,
quadcopters, night vision devices, and bulletproof vests from Turkey and are using
cryptocurrency transactions to avoid purchase tracking.
Taken in tandem, these reports
indicate that the Kremlin seeks to circumvent sanctions by engaging in quid-pro-quo and
under-the-table negotiations with foreign actors.
Wagner Group forces are continuing to exaggerate their claimed territorial
gains in Donbas to further distinguish themselves from proxy and
