1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Madison Williams, and Mason Clark
November 7, 8pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a rare statement on November 7 in response to extensive
Russian milblogger outcry on November 6 about reported extensive losses and poor command within the
155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet. Russian milbloggers published and circulated a letter that claimed
Russian military leadership “threw” the brigade into an “incomprehensible offensive” near Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast, where
it suffered losses amounting to over 300 killed, wounded, and missing and lost half of its equipment, all within four days.
The letter explicitly blamed Eastern Military District Commander Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov, 155th Naval
Infantry Brigade Commander Colonel Zurab Akhmedov, and Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for the
brigade’s losses and called on Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako to conduct an independent review of the actions
of the officers involved in planning and conducting the recent Russian offensive push in western Donetsk Oblast.[1] The
tone of many Russian milblogger responses to the letter resembles the response following the destruction of a Russian
motorized rifle brigade crossing the SIverskyi Donets River on May 11, after which many pro-war milbloggers increased
their direct criticism of the Russian military.[2]
The Russian MoD issued a rare response on November 7 to the outcry on and claimed that less than one percent of the
brigade was killed and less than seven percent was wounded within the past 10 days, and that Ukrainian forces suffered high
losses instead.[3] Kozhemyako also sought to address the outcry and claimed that the brigade’s losses are greatly
exaggerated and (without providing evidence) speculated that the letter was a product of Ukrainian special
services.[4] Kozhemyako stated that he contacted the brigade’s command and referred the case to the Russian military
prosecutor.[5] Some Russian milbloggers agreed, claiming that Russian losses could not be as high as the brigade claimed,
even calling the brigade’s letter exaggerated or fake.[6] The Russian MoD has remained remarkably tight-lipped
about milblogger critiques of Russian failures throughout the war in Ukraine — unlike the Kremlin, which
will occasionally indirectly address milblogger narratives. The MoD’s public response to milblogger outcry
indicates that some Russian milbloggers have considerable leverage to shape MoD interactions in the
information space and additionally suggests that the situation in Pavlivka is dire enough to warrant a
response.
Discourse regarding the widespread failures of the Russian military establishment has pervaded beyond
the milblogger information space and is increasingly coloring social dynamics. Russian milbloggers stated that
women, presumably relatives of Russian military and mobilized personnel, have been calling attention to the failing state of
the war by reaching out to milbloggers and local government officials.[7] ISW has observed multiple instances of Russian
military personnel’s wives and mothers advocating for their relatives serving in the military by reaching out to local officials
and prominent Russian milbloggers since the beginning of partial mobilization in late September.[8] The Russian MoD’s
failure to properly address these systemic issues and their root causes will likely exacerbate these societal tensions
throughout the war.
The Russian pro-war siloviki faction is increasing its influence in part to advance personal interests in
Russia and occupied Ukraine, not strictly to win the war. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed
on November 6 that Wagner is opening training and management centers for people’s militias in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts
that will function outside of the Russian Armed Forces.[9] ISW previously assessed that Prigozhin is undertaking efforts to
strengthen his independent power base following his reported meeting with Kursk Oblast businessmen on the creation of
regional people’s militia that symbolically occurred on Russia’s Unity Day (November 4).[10] Prigozhin emphasized that
Russian officials must assign regional businesses the responsibility to supply the militia rather than relying on the Kremlin.
Prigozhin’s Unity Day media appearances also captured the same notion of cooperation between the Russian government
and business, which likely indicates that he is attempting to grow his Wagner-focused power base in Russia while
undercutting unified Russian operations in Ukraine. Prigozhin also started construction of an independent fortification
dubbed the “Wagner Line” in Belgorod Oblast in late October.[11] Prigozhin consistently defames St. Petersburg Governor
Alexander Beglov, and the recent grand opening of the Wagner Center in St. Petersburg on Unity Day may suggest that
Prigozhin is attempting to infiltrate the city’s business sphere.[12]
Another member of the siloviki party, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, is also reportedly attempting to secure business
opportunities on the back of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Kadyrov and his
field commanders are growing business networks in the occupied territories, and Ukrainian officials previously claimed that
