Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, and Frederick W.
Kagan
October 25, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Members of the Russian siloviki faction continue to voice their dissatisfaction with
Russian war efforts in Ukraine, indicating that Russian President Vladimir Putin will
continue to struggle to appease the pro-war constituency in the long term. The Russian
siloviki faction refers to people with meaningful power bases within Putin’s inner circle who are fielding
combat forces in Ukraine. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov complained that the Russian response to
claimed Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory have been “weak,” noting that Russia must “erase
Ukrainian cities from the earth.”
Kadyrov also claimed that Russia is now engaged in a war with
Ukraine instead of a “special military operation,” given that Ukrainian forces are fighting on “Russian
territory.” Kadyrov noted that he is unhappy with the lack of Russian retaliation despite the
establishment of martial law. Kadyrov had remained relatively quiet throughout October.
Kadyrov’s statement indirectly criticizes the scale of the Russian missile campaign against Ukrainian
energy infrastructure and is in line with milblogger critiques that followed days after the first massive
campaign on October 10.
ISW has previously assessed that that Putin’s missile campaign is unlikely to
satisfy the pro-war nationalist camp in the long term, given that Putin cannot fix the many flaws within
the Russian military campaign in Ukraine nor can he deliver his maximalist promises.
Kadyrov’s rant
also highlights Putin’s error in annexing four Ukrainian oblasts before Russian forces reached the
oblasts’ borders, which has created confusion about where “Russian territory” begins. ISW has
previously reported that Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian territories has likely triggered criticism within
the Kremlin elite, which will likely intensify as Putin loses more occupied territories.
Russian siloviki have also directly confronted Putin regarding the progress of the
Russian war in Ukraine, which further highlights their significance within Russian
power structures. The Washington Post, citing US intelligence, revealed that Wagner Group
financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin sharply criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in a private
conversation.
Prigozhin reportedly accused the Russian MoD of heavily relying on Wagner forces while
failing to finance the group or provide necessary resources, which is consistent with his numerous
public statements.
Prigozhin has denied ever criticizing the Russian Armed Forces in response to The
Washington Post report—a denial that is patently false given his repeated public attacks on the MoD.
The criticism revealed by The Post further supports ISW’s assessment that Prigozhin holds a unique
position that allows him to reap the benefits of Putin’s dependency on Wagner forces without having
formal responsibility for any axis or area in Ukraine and while wielding considerable influence in the
information space. Prigozhin is accumulating a following on Telegram (with some Wagner-affiliated
channels having over 300,000 followers), is directly interacting with online publications, and is
reportedly financing the RiaFan (Federal News Agency) media conglomerate.
Prigozhin is likely using
a growing number of platforms to accrue power and has even previously engaged RiaFan in promoting
his September prisoner recruitment drive to Russian audiences.
Putin’s regime is largely
