Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 14
Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W.
Kagan
October 14, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin likely attempted to make a virtue of necessity by
announcing that his “partial” mobilization will end in “about two weeks”—the same time
the postponed fall conscription cycle is set to begin. Putin told reporters on October 14 that
“nothing additional is planned” and that "partial mobilization is almost over."
As ISW previously
reported, Putin announced the postponement of Russia’s usual autumn conscription cycle from
October 1 to November 1 on September 30, likely because Russia’s partial mobilization is taxing the
bureaucracy of the Russian military commissariats that oversee the semiannual conscription cycle.
Putin therefore likely needs to pause or end his partial mobilization to free up bureaucratic resources
for conscription. Putin ordered the conscription of 120,000 men for the autumn cycle, 7,000 fewer than
in autumn 2021. However, Russia’s annexation of occupied Ukraine changes the calculus for conscripts.
Russian law generally prohibits the deployment of conscripts abroad. Russian law now considers
Russian-occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts to be Russian territory, however,
ostensibly legalizing the use of conscripts on the front lines.
Putin may intend for mobilized personnel to plug gaps in Russia’s frontlines long enough
for the autumn conscripts to receive some training and form additional units to improve
Russian combat power in 2023. Putin confirmed on October 14 that mobilized personnel are
receiving little training before they are sent to the frontlines. Putin announced that of the 220,000
people who have been mobilized since his September 21 order, 35,000 are already in Russian military
units and 16,000 are already in units “involved in combat missions.”
Putin also outlined the training
these mobilized forces allegedly receive: 5-10 days of “initial training,” 5-15 days of training with combat
units, “then the next stage is already directly in the troops taking part in hostilities.” This statement
corroborates dozens of anecdotal reports from Russian outlets, milbloggers, and mobilized personnel
of untrained, unequipped, and utterly unprepared men being rushed to the frontlines, where some have
already surrendered to Ukrainian forces and others have been killed.
Even the 10 days of training that
mobilized personnel may receive likely does not consist of actual combat preparation for most units;
anecdotal reports suggest that men in some units wandered around training grounds without
commanding officers, food, or shelter for several days before being shipped to Ukraine.
Many would-
be trainers and officers were likely injured or killed in Ukraine before mobilization began.
Russian
training grounds are also likely understaffed, a problem that will likely persist into the autumn
conscription cycle. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 14 that Russian military officials
in Krasnodar Krai suspended sending mobilized persons to the training grounds in Primorsko-Akhtarsk
until November 1 because Russian training grounds are not ready to accommodate, train or
comprehensively provide for a large number of personnel.
Ukrainian and Western officials continue to reiterate that they have observed no
indicators of preparations for a Belarusian invasion of Ukraine, despite alarmist reports
in the Belarusian information space that President Alexander Lukashenko has
introduced a “counter-terrorist operation” regime.
Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir
