Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 13
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 13, 9:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Public reports of the first deaths of ill-prepared mobilized Russian troops in Ukraine have sparked
renewed criticism of the Russian military command. Russian media reported that five mobilized men from
Chelyabinsk have already died in combat in Ukraine just three weeks after President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of
partial mobilization on September 21.[1] The report led many pro-war milbloggers to claim that the number of dead and
wounded among mobilized servicemen is likely higher than this due to lack of promised training, equipment, unit
cohesion, and commanders, as well as repeated instances of wrongful mobilization.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District (SMD),
Mikhail Zusko, ordered the immediate deployment without any pre-combat training of newly mobilized servicemen of the
15th Regiment of the 27th Motor Rifle Brigade from Moscow City and Moscow Oblast to the collapsing frontline around
Svatove around October 2nd and 3rd.[2] Ukrainian outlets had previously reported that the Kremlin has arrested Zusko
due to combat losses, and it is unclear why an SMD commander would issue orders pertaining to a unit within the
Western Military District (WMD).[3] Milbloggers noted that relatives found half of the 15th Regiment personnel wounded
in a Belgorod Oblast hospital after the unit got caught in heavy artillery fire when attempting to reach the Svatove
frontline. Milbloggers noted that the regiment had no orders, military command supervision, signal, or supplies, and that
the other half of its personnel is still at the Svatove frontline. Another milblogger noted witnessing the coffins of mobilized
men arrive in Chelaybinsk, Moscow, and Yekaterenburg, and claimed that many mobilized men are surrendering to
Ukrainian forces.[4] One Russian milblogger complained on October 13 that newly mobilized men are being deployed in a
haphazard way that will lead to 10,000 deaths and 40,000 injuries among them by February 2023.[5]
Russian mobilization structures are continuing to face bureaucratic challenges, which may further undermine the combat
effectiveness of mobilized personnel. Milbloggers claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) did not set proper
conditions to integrate and monitor the deployment of mobilized men at the frontlines.[6] Russian military units
reportedly disperse mobilized men among different units without keeping proper records of their deployed locations on
the frontlines, causing families to complain to military leadership. Russian military officials are also continuing to assign
men with previous military experience to units that do not match their expertise. One milblogger even warned that
Russian MoD’s inability to properly update families of the whereabouts of their relatives will lead mothers and wives to
form human rights groups that “will break Russia from within.”[7]
ISW cannot independently verify milblogger claims, but the community has been proactive in highlighting the Kremlin’s
mobilization since the day of its declaration in hopes of improving the prospects of the Russian war in Ukraine.[8] ISW
has also previously reported on a video of mobilized men from Moscow Oblast in Svatove who complained about their lack
of equipment and deployment to the frontlines without proper training, which corroborates some milblogger
reports.[9] The persistence of such complaints supports ISW’s assessment that the mobilization campaign will not
produce enough combat-ready Russian personnel to affect the course of the war in the short term. The Kremlin’s rapid
deployment of mobilized servicemen to the Kreminna-Svatove line may also indicate that Russian President Vladimir
Putin is willing to throw away the lives of mobilized men in a desperate effort to preserve a collapsing frontline.
The Kremlin continues to struggle to message itself out of the reality of mobilization and military
failures. The Kremlin continued its general pattern of temporarily appeasing the nationalist communities by conducting
retaliatory missile strikes on Ukraine in an effort to deflect from persistent mobilization problems. Renewed milblogger
critiques about mobilization again show how ephemeral the Kremlin’s successes are at deflecting attention from them. The
nationalist community resumed its calls on the Kremlin to replace senior officials and commanders and declare war,
which some had anticipated would be the Kremlin’s response to the Kerch Strait Bridge explosions, broken mobilization
process, and loss of most of Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman.[10] The Kremlin remains trapped in a cycle of appeasing its pro-
war constituencies but retaining Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a limited war in Ukraine that is incompatible
with their demands and expectations.
