Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 12
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 12, 7:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russia has seemingly intensified its information operation to falsely portray Ukraine as
a terrorist state, likely to set information conditions to counter efforts to designate
Russia as a terrorist state. Several Russian sources made unverified claims that Russian Federal
Security Service (FSB) officers detained Ukrainian citizens for allegedly planning “terrorist attacks” in
Sverdlovsk, Moscow, and Bryansk oblasts on October 12.
Russian milbloggers relatedly amplified
rhetoric accusing Ukraine of being a terrorist state and calling for Russian authorities to enhance
“counterintelligence” procedures and formally designate Ukraine as a terrorist state.
Claims of
preparations for alleged and subversive Ukrainian activity in Russia align with a wider attempt to set
information conditions to respond to Ukrainian attempts to formally designate Russia a terrorist state,
especially in the wake of recent massive attacks on critical Ukrainian infrastructure and residential
areas. The Russian information space may also be setting conditions to justify further massive strikes
on Ukrainian rear areas; although, as ISW has previously assessed, these tactics are part of the Russian
way of war and will likely be utilized regardless of informational conditions.
Russian authorities may
also be setting conditions for false-flag attacks against Russia framed as Ukrainian-perpetrated acts of
terrorism.
Russian forces may have brought Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-
affiliated personnel to occupied areas in Ukraine to train Russian troops in the use of
Shahed-136 drones. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 12 that Russian forces
brought an unspecified number of Iranian instructors to Dzankoi in Crimea and Zalizniy Port and
Hladivtsi in Kherson Oblast to teach Russian forces how to use Shahed-136 attack drones.
The
Resistance Center stated that the Iranian instructors directly control the launch of drones on civilian
targets in Ukraine, including in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.
The IRGC is notably the primary operator
of Iran‘s drone inventory, so these Iranian instructors are likely IRGC or IRGC-affiliated personnel.
Key Takeaways
• Russia is intensifying efforts to set information conditions to falsely portray
Ukraine as a terrorist state to deflect recent calls to designate Russia as a
terrorist state.
• Russian forces may have imported Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC)-affiliated personnel to occupied areas in Ukraine to train Russian troops
in the use of Shahed-136 drones.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops continued counteroffensive
operations toward Svatove and Kreminna. Russian forces are continuing
defensive operations in this area.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting ground
attacks in northwestern and western Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
