1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 9
Special Edition on Russian Domestic Responses to the Kerch Strait Bridge Explosion
Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan
October 9, 9:35 ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
This campaign assessment special edition focuses on Russian domestic responses to the Kerch Strait
Bridge explosion on October 9 and changes within the Russian chain of command. Ukrainian forces
continued to make advances towards Svatove-Kreminna highway on October 9. Those developments are
summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow.
The attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge, coupled with recent Russian military failures and partial
mobilization, is generating direct criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin from
the Russian pro-war nationalist community. Some milbloggers, who represent and speak to that community on
Telegram, criticized Putin’s and the Kremlin’s failure to address major events forthrightly, noting that it is challenging to
rally behind Putin when his government relies on secrecy.[1] Others noted that Putin has consistently failed to address
incidents such as the sinking of the cruiser Moskva or the prisoner exchange of Azovstal fighters whom the Kremlin had
consistently demonized since the Battle of Mariupol.[2] Some milbloggers said that Putin must retaliate for the explosion
on the Kerch Strait Bridge lest his silence be perceived as ”weakness.”[3] Milbloggers who did not criticize Putin instead
criticized Russian Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev’s silence following the explosion after he
had made several public claims that an attack on the Crimean Bridge was a Russian “red line.”[4] Direct criticism of Putin
from this community is almost unprecedented. Milbloggers and other nationalist figures continue to express
overwhelming support for Putin’s goals in Ukraine and have hitherto blamed failures and setbacks on the Russian military
command or the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
These critiques from the pro-war camp may indicate rising doubts about Putin’s ability to deliver on his
promised goal of “denazifying” Ukraine and may undermine Putin’s appeal within his core
constituency. Putin’s stated objectives for the invasion he launched on February 24 deeply resonated with the
nationalist community, which firmly subscribes to the ideology of Russia’s historic and cultural superiority and right to
control over the territories of the former Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. Recent military failures have caused some
milbloggers to become concerned about Putin’s commitment to that ideology, however, with some milbloggers even
accusing him of failing to uphold the ideology even prior to the full-scale invasion in February 2022. One milblogger noted
on October 7 his disgust with the Russian political elite, including Putin, for consistently failing to seize Ukraine after the
Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 and for conducting an “ugly special military operation” that only further united
Ukrainians and the West against Russia.[5]
Milbloggers’ dissatisfaction with Putin’s inability to enforce his own “red lines” is rooted in his failure to properly establish
information conditions prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin had defined red lines as NATO expansion and the
delivery of strategic weapons systems including nuclear-capable systems to Ukraine prior to the invasion but he has not
publicly adjusted these “red lines” since the invasion began.[6] Milbloggers have thus latched onto Medvedev’s declared
“red lines,” which Putin has not publicly affirmed let alone enforced--facts that have only further disappointed them. The
Kremlin has left room for confusion regarding its own vision for the war from the outset, a fact that may threaten its
continuing support among people for whom the most extreme and grandiose objectives resonate.
Other Russian nationalists, propagandists, and proxy officials are blaming security services and the
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), a phenomenon that can undermine Putin’s regime in the long
term. Komsomolkaya Pravda journalist and Russian reserve Colonel Viktor Baranets put responsibility for the explosion
on the Kerch Strait Bridge on Russian security services, whom he called “traitors.”[7] Baranets’ statements prompted a
wave of criticism from milbloggers, with some even accusing him of advocating for censorship among milbloggers and
being affiliated with foreign agents.[8] Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov openly accused the Russian MoD of only
releasing useless statements instead of actually regaining the initiative on the battlefield.[9] The Kremlin may be doubling
down on the known milblogger distaste for the Russian MoD to use its military leadership as a scapegoat for its military
failures.
The perception of the trajectory of the war and of Ukrainian capabilities is changing as well, and
Russians are undergoing a rude awakening. Russian sources have recognized that the Ukrainian southern counter-
offensive poses a significant threat to Russian forces across southern Ukraine.[10] This recognition is a significant
deviation from the previous narrative presented by propagandists, milbloggers, and the Russian MoD for months that
