Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 7
Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 7, 9:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Western and Russian reports of fractures within the Kremlin are gaining traction within
the Russian information space, undermining the appearance of stability of Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s regime. The Washington Post reported that US intelligence obtained
information that a member of Putin’s inner circle directly criticized Putin’s “extensive military
shortcomings” during the war in Ukraine, and other Western and Kremlin-affiliated officials noted
rising criticism of Putin’s mishandling of the war and mobilization.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry
Peskov acknowledged that there have been debates in the Kremlin regarding mobilization in a
statement to The Washington Post but denied all allegations of a member of the Kremlin confronting
Putin. ISW cannot verify any of these reports are real or assess the likelihood that these arguments or
fractures will change Putin’s mind about continuing the war, let alone if they will destabilize his regime.
Word of fractures within Putin’s inner circle have reached the hyper-patriotic and nationalist
milblogger crowd, however, undermining the impression of strength and control that Putin has sought
to portray throughout his reign.
Some Russian milbloggers have begun speculating that there are two factions within the Kremlin
following Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Private Military Company financier Yevgeny
Prigozhin’s harsh criticism of the Russian higher military command.
A milblogger told his nearly one
million readers that Kadyrov and Prigozhin are part of the faction that seeks to continue the war and
accomplish its ideological goals regardless of cost. The milblogger noted that the faction opposed to
them consisted of government officials who wish to negotiate with the West to save their assets and
residences in the West but are too afraid to confront Putin directly. The milblogger expressed hope that
the pro-war faction will defeat the faction that fails to see that Russia cannot afford to end the war.
The presentation of fundamental disagreements within Putin’s inner circle and challenges to his
decisions, even if quiet, within the Russian nationalist space risks depicting Putin as weak and not fully
in control of his government. The truth or falseness of that presentation is less important than its
injection into the audiences on which Putin most relies for continued support in his war. Putin himself
may have externalized his own concerns about this break in the façade of his power and of the unanimity
of his trusted senior officials in an odd exchange with a teacher on October 5.
Putin asked the teacher
how he taught his students about the causes of the Pugachev Rebellion that challenged Catherine the
Great in the mid-1770s.
The teacher, from Izhevsk, one of the towns that Pugachev captured during
his revolt, offered answers that did not satisfy Putin, including the observation that the rebellion had
occurred because of the appearance of “a leader who could capitalize on a wave of dissatisfaction,” and
that the lesson to be drawn from that episode of history was “that it is necessary to respect the views of
other members of society.” Putin offered his own answer: “The leader [Pugachev] claimed to be tsar.
And how did that arise? Why was that possible?...Because of the element of weakening of the central
power.”
The exchange was bizarre and fascinating since there is no reason Pugachev’s Rebellion should
have been on Putin’s mind at this time, nor any reason for him to worry about someone else “claiming
to be tsar.”—unless, of course, Putin himself perceives a weakening of the central power, i.e., himself.
