1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Katherine Lawlor, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 3, 9 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains around Lyman and in Kherson Oblast in the last 48
hours. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops made significant breakthroughs in northern
Kherson Oblast between October 2 and 3.[1] Geolocated footage corroborates Russian claims that Ukrainian troops are
continuing to push east of Lyman and may have broken through the Luhansk Oblast border in the direction of
Kreminna.[2] As ISW has previously reported, the Russian groupings in northern Kherson Oblast and on the Lyman front
were largely comprised of units that had been regarded as among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces before the
war.[3] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army reportedly withdrew from
Lyman to rear positions near Kreminna before October 2.[4] Russian sources previously reported that elements of the
Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), especially the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, are active in Kherson Oblast.[5] Both the
144th Motorized Rifle Division and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division were previously lauded as some of Russia’s most
elite forces, and their apparent failures to hold territory against major Ukrainian counter-offensive actions is consistent
with ISW’s previous assessment that even the most elite Russian military forces are becoming increasingly degraded as the
war continues. This phenomenon was also visible in the collapse of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army
earlier in the Kharkiv counter-offensive.[6]
Russian President Vladimir Putin may be continuing efforts to redirect blame for recent Russian military
failures in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian outlet РБК (RBK), citing sources within the Russian regime, reported on October
3 that Lieutenant-General Roman Berdnikov has replaced Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlev as commander of the
Western Military District (WMD).[7] As ISW previously assessed, WMD units have been largely operating in northeastern
Kharkiv Oblast over the last few months but without a clear commander. Zhuravlev has not been seen for some time, and
Putin cycled through two commanders of the “western grouping of forces" in two weeks. Putin may be attempting to
redirect the growing anger for Russian losses in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman by assigning a new face prominently to the
WMD.[8] This announcement may also be an effort to shield Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central
Military District (CMD), from widespread criticism for recent Russian failures around Lyman.[9] Putin may seek to shift
the blame for future Russian losses in Kharkiv and possibly Luhansk Oblasts to Berdnikov. Criticism of Lapin in recent
days has served as a catalyst for wider breakdown within the Russian nationalist information space, and Berdnikov’s
appointment may be intended to distract and redirect that growing dissatisfaction.
Russian officials released Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) director Ihor Murashov from
detention and are likely continuing to undermine Ukrainian control of the plant. Energoatom reported that
the Russian military detained Director General of the ZNPP Ihor Murashov on September 30 and released him into
Ukrainian-controlled territory on October 3 following talks with International Atomic Energy Agency Director General
Raphael Grossi.[10] Russian officials will likely not allow Murashov to return to his position at the ZNPP. Russian officials
will likely attempt to use their physical removal of Murashov to assert further control over the nuclear power plant.
Key Takeaways
• Ukrainian forces have made substantial gains around Lyman and in northern Kherson Oblast
over the last 24 hours. The Russian units defeated on these fronts were previously considered
to be among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may use the appointment of Lieutenant-General Roman
Berdnikov to the command of the Western Military District to redirect blame for recent or
future Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian officials released the director of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, whom they
had illegally detained, and are likely continuing to undermine Ukrainian control of the plant.
• Ukrainian forces made advances on the Oskil River-Kreminna line towards the Luhansk oblast
border.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is introducing punitive measures to target the Russian
bureaucratic institutions responsible for the execution of partial mobilization.
