1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,
October 2
Special Edition on Changes in the Russian Information
Space Following the Defeat in Lyman
Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan
October 2, 10:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
This campaign assessment special edition focuses on dramatic changes in the
Russian information space following the Russian defeat around Lyman and
in Kharkiv Oblast and amid the failures of Russia’s partial mobilization.
Ukrainian forces made continued gains around Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, and
have broken through Russian defensive positions in northeastern Kherson
Oblast. Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in
more detail tomorrow when more confirmation is available.
The Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman, combined with the
Kremlin’s failure to conduct partial mobilization effectively and fairly are
fundamentally changing the Russian information space. Kremlin-sponsored
media and Russian milbloggers – a prominent Telegram community composed of Russian
war correspondents, former proxy officials, and nationalists – are grieving the loss of
Lyman while simultaneously criticizing the bureaucratic failures of the partial
mobilization.
Kremlin sources and milbloggers are attributing the defeat around Lyman
and Kharkiv Oblast to Russian military failures to properly supply and reinforce Russian
forces in northern Donbas and complaining about the lack of transparency regarding the
progress of war.
Some guests on heavily-edited Kremlin television shows that aired on October 1 even
criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian oblasts
before securing their administrative borders or even the frontline, expressing doubts
about Russia’s ability ever to occupy the entirety of these territories.
Kremlin
propagandists no longer conceal their disappointment in the conduct of the partial
mobilization, frequently discussing the illegal mobilization of some men and noting issues
such as alcoholism among newly mobilized forces.
Some speaking on live television have
expressed the concern that mobilization will not generate the force necessary to regain the
initiative on the battlefield, given the poor quality of Russian reserves.
The Russian information space has significantly deviated from the narratives
preferred by the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that
things are generally under control. The current onslaught of criticism and reporting
of operational military details by the Kremlin’s propagandists has come to resemble the
milblogger discourse over this past week. The Kremlin narrative had focused on general
statements of progress and avoided detailed discussions of current military operations.
The Kremlin had never openly recognized a major failure in the war prior to its devastating
loss in Kharkiv Oblast, which prompted the partial reserve mobilization.
