Institute for the Study of War &
AEI’s Critical Threats Project
2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W.
Kagan
October 1, 7 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian forces inflicted another significant operational defeat on Russia
and liberated Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, on October 1. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lyman to “more
advantageous positions” to avoid the “threat of encirclement” in the settlement.
Social
media footage and Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces have
entered Lyman and are likely clearing the settlement as of October 1.
The Russian information space – composed of Kremlin propagandists,
pundits, and milbloggers – registered the defeat as the result of the Russian
military command’s failure to send reinforcements in a timely manner, while
openly criticizing repeated bureaucratic failures during the mobilization.
Russian commentators overwhelmingly expressed their hopes that partial mobilization
would generate enough force to resume offensive operations and regain the initiative.
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, apparently devastated by the defeat in Lyman, called on
Russia to continue to fight to ”liberate” the four annexed territories with all available
means including low-yield nuclear weapons.
Kadyrov’s rant is similar to the disorganized and often hyperbolic milblogger rants that
call for the Kremlin to continue the war in Ukraine, and his call for the use of nuclear
weapons was not representative of the discourse within the Russian information space.
Russian federal TV channels and ultra-hawkish milbloggers have often discussed Russian
nuclear capabilities as part of their efforts to stoke patriotic sentiments among Russian
domestic audiences, and Kadyrov’s statement was not especially noteworthy in this
context.
Kadyrov’s call for using tactical nuclear weapons is likely inconsistent with his demands
to continue the “special military operation” to bring more Ukrainian territory under
Russian control. The Russian military in its current state is almost certainly unable to
operate on a nuclear battlefield even though it has the necessary equipment and has
historically trained its units to do so. The chaotic agglomeration of exhausted contract
soldiers, hastily mobilized reservists, conscripts, and mercenaries that currently comprise
the Russian ground forces could not function in a nuclear environment. Any areas affected
by Russian tactical nuclear weapons would thus be impassible for the Russians, likely
precluding Russian advances. This consideration is another factor that reduces the
likelihood of Russian tactical nuclear weapons use.
Kadyrov blamed the commander of the Central Military District (CMD),
Colonel General Alexander Lapin, for failures around Lyman. Kadyrov’s
attacks gained significant traction within the Russian information space and
indicates that the rift between Russian traditional and non-traditional forces
