俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2022年9月28日

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 28, 7:30pm ET
Click here to see ISWs interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian milbloggers discussed Ukrainian gains around Lyman with increased concern on
September 28, suggesting that Russian forces in this area may face imminent defeat.
1
Several
Russian milbloggers and prominent military correspondents claimed that Ukrainian troops advanced west,
north, and northeast of Lyman and are working to complete the envelopment of Russian troops in Lyman and
along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in this area.
2
Russian mibloggers stated that Ukrainian
troops are threatening Russian positions and lines of communication that support the Lyman grouping. The
collapse of the Lyman pocket will likely be highly consequential to the Russian grouping in northern Donetsk
and western Luhansk oblasts and may allow Ukrainian troops to threaten Russian positions along the western
Luhansk Oblast border and in the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.
Russian military leadership has failed to set information conditions for potentially imminent
Russian defeat in Lyman. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not addressed current Russian losses around
Lyman or prepared for the collapse of this sector of the frontline, which will likely further reduce already-low
Russian morale. Russian military authorities previously failed to set sufficient information conditions for
Russian losses following the first stages of the Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv Oblast, devastating morale
and leading to panic among Russian forces across the Eastern axis. The subsequent ire of the Russian nationalist
information space likely played a role in driving the Kremlin to order partial mobilization in the days following
Ukraine’s initial sweeping counteroffensive in a haphazard attempt to reinforce Russian lines. Future Ukrainian
gains around critical areas in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast may drive additional wedges between Russian
nationalists and military leadership, and between Russian forces and their superiors.
The Kremlin could temporarily postpone announcing the annexation of Russian-occupied
Ukrainian territory to better prepare the Russian information space and administrative
organization, although September 30 remains the most likely date for some kind of annexation
announcement. ISW forecasted on September 27 that Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely announce
the Russian annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory on September 30 in his planned address to both houses
of the Russian parliament.
3
The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on September 28 that Russia will “fulfill
the aspirations of the residents of the LNR, DNR, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to be together with Russia” in
the “near future.”
4
However, Russian State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin announced on September 28 that
the State Duma should hold its accession sessions to approve the annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory on
October 3 and 4.
5
Latvian-based Russian-language opposition outlet Meduza quoted Kremlin sources on
September 28 who claimed that the Kremlin decided ”not to rush things.” Those sources told Meduza that ”the
PR effect from [annexation] will be almost zero” due to broad dissatisfaction with partial mobilization in Russia.
6
Meduza reported that the Kremlin conducted a dissatisfactory closed public opinion poll that demonstrated
broad Russian discontent and may be attempting to rectify public unhappiness with mobilization before
announcing annexation.
Russian-appointed occupation administration leaders of Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk Oblasts
each shared an appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin by September 28, asking Putin to recognize their
sham referenda and welcome them to Russia.
7
The Russian occupation leaders of each oblast will likely meet
with Putin in the coming days to present their requests. Putin could announce those performative accession
negotiations, rather than final annexation, in his September 30 speech.
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