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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 29
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W.
Kagan
September 29, 7:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin continues to violate its stated “partial mobilization” procedures and
contradict its own messaging even while recognizing the systematic failures within the
Russian bureaucracy just eight days after the declaration of mobilization. Russian
President Vladimir Putin acknowledged and deflected the blame for repeated “mistakes” during the
first week of mobilization in his opening remarks at the Russian Security Council meeting on September
29.
Putin recounted instances of mobilizing men without prior military experience, assigning
servicemen to the wrong specializations, and unfairly mobilizing men with health conditions or large
families. ISW has previously reported that Kremlin-state media began exploring similar complaints just
days after Putin’s declaration of “partial mobilization.”
Putin called on the Russian General Staff,
Ministry of Defense (MoD), and federal subjects to fix the reported problems with mobilization, while
noting that prosecutors and working groups within enlistment centers will monitor all complaints.
Speaker of the Russian State Duma Vyacheslav Volodin also announced that Russian men with a
military registration cannot leave their permanent residence without the approval of enlistment
centers.
Volodin and the Kremlin’s Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov later retracted these statements,
noting that the Russian MoD informed him that Russian officials may only restrict the movement of
military-registered men in case of full mobilization.
Republic of Dagestan Head Sergey Melikov also
condemned a police car with a loudspeaker that ordered all men to appear at the enlistment center
while driving around Derbente, Republic of Dagestan, stating that local authorities did not authorize
such announcements.
The Kremlin’s contradictory statements and procedures demonstrate the fundamental
nature of the systemic weakness of the Russian military establishment that have
characterized the entire invasion. Russian officials continue to execute a supposed reservist call-
up as a confused undertaking somewhere between a conscription drive and the declaration of general
mobilization, likely issuing conflicting orders to already flawed bureaucratic institutions. CIA Director
Williams Burns noted that even if the Kremlin manages to mobilize 300,000 men it will not be able to
ensure logistic support or provide sufficient training and equipment to the newly-mobilized men.
Ukrainian military officials noted that Russian forces have already committed mobilized men to
Kharkiv Oblast who have since told the Ukrainian forces that they did not receive any training prior to
their deployment around September 15.
The bureaucratic failures in the Russian partial mobilization may indicate that Putin has
again bypassed the Russian higher military command or the Russian MoD. The deployment
of mobilized men to centers of hostilities on the Kharkiv or Kherson frontlines may suggest that Putin
is directly working with axis commanders on the ground who are likely clamoring for reinforcements,
rather than following standard military practices (that are also required by Russian law) such as
providing training to the mobilized prior to their deployment to the frontlines. ISW has previously
reported that Putin bypassed the Russian chain of command on numerous occasions when making
decisions regarding the progress of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine, likely because
he had lost confidence in the Russian MoD.
The contradictory and inconsistent narratives used by
