1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 24
Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 24, 9 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s declarations about which categories of
Russian males will be exempted from partial mobilization may not reflect Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s intentions or orders. A Russian media insider claimed on
September 24 that officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reprimanded military commissars
in person for negligence in carrying out mobilization and sending out summonses in “excess,” and
contrary to the explicit MoD guidance regarding exemptions for age, disability, or other limiting
factors.
1
Another Russian source claimed that certain heads of federal subjects acknowledged that they
have mobilized citizens who are technically ineligible.
2
Responsibility for the partial mobilization appears to be divided and complex, possibly
contributing to confusion, disorganization, and violations of Shoigu’s commitments
regarding exemptions. The mobilization decree specifies that Russian federal subjects are
responsible for executing the mobilization while the MoD sets quotas and deadlines for filling them.
3
A Russian milblogger, in fact, criticized the governor of Russia’s Belgorod Oblast for not being an active
participant in the mobilization process and noted that the mobilization decree places the onus of
carrying out mobilization orders on the heads of federal subjects and not on military commissars.
4
Military commissars likely work for the heads of federal subjects, however, rather than directly for the
MoD, making both responsible for mobilization and creating a possible gap between them and the
Defense Ministry.
The military commissars are generally acting as if they had received orders to prioritize
getting bodies to training centers over adhering to Shoigu’s guidelines, and the
seemingly confused chains of responsibility for executing the mobilization decree may
be responsible for the divergence between Shoigu’s statements and commissars’ actions.
Shoigu emphatically reiterated on September 21 that mobilization is partial and will only rely on those
already in the reserve and with combat experience and military experience, but military commissars
failed to adhere to Shoigu’s guidance, practically from the onset of the mobilization order.
5
Continued
reports of military commissars conducting chaotic distribution of mobilization summonses indicate
that they feel significant pressure to carry out mobilization as quickly as possible. Ukrainian sources
reported that Russian authorities are immediately mobilizing individuals in occupied areas of Ukraine
after “rewarding” them with Russian passports for participating in sham referenda rather than waiting
until annexation makes the mobilization of eligible males in Russian-occupied areas legal under
Russian law. This haste suggests that military commissars feel pressure to expedite mobilization which
is not reflected in Shoigu’s statements.
6
The MoD is evidently not in full control of mobilization, raising
questions about which Russian males actually will be mobilized and how effective the mobilized force
will be.
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