1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 23
Kateryna Stepanenko, Katherine Lawlor, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
September 23, 10:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian mobilization system is struggling to execute the task Russian President
Vladimir Putin set and will likely fail to produce mobilized reserve forces even of the low
quality that Putin’s plans would have generated unless the Kremlin can rapidly fix
fundamental and systemic problems. Putin and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that
the Russian Armed Forces would mobilize combat-ready reservists to quickly stabilize the frontlines
and regain the initiative on the battlefield.
Milblogger and social media reports, however, show that
Russian military recruitment centers, enlistment officials, and local administrations are mobilizing
men who do not meet the Kremlin’s stated criteria, especially Shoigu’s promise that mobilization would
prioritize men with “combat experience.” Russian opposition outlets and Telegram channels leaked
information suggesting that the Kremlin aims to complete this partial mobilization by November 10
and that the Kremlin is seeking to mobilize 1.2 million men instead of the publicly announced 300,000.
ISW cannot verify these reports, but significant available information suggests that this mobilization
campaign (the first in post-Soviet Russia) is overwhelming an ineffective and unmotivated bureaucratic
system and could fail to generate the much-needed combat-ready reserve force in a short time or at all.
Russian pro-war milbloggers and social media users are raising concerns about unlawful
mobilization practices and showcasing many serious Russian mobilization problems on
the second day of the mobilization effort. Russian milbloggers reported receiving numerous
complaints from social media users that older men, students, employees of military industries, and
civilians with no prior military experience are receiving illegal mobilization notices.
Shoigu and other
officials have repeatedly stated that these categories of individuals would be exempt from this partial
mobilization. Other sources reported that Russians are mobilizing airport and airline employees and
workers from other industries.
The Russian government FAQ portal also indicated that local
mobilization-enforcing officials may mobilize part-time students, despite the Kremlin’s declaration that
no students will undergo mobilization.
Some milbloggers noted that Russian enlistment personnel are assigning men with prior military
service to very different specializations from those in which they served, while other sources recounted
instances of military recruitment centers mobilizing men with chronic illnesses.
The quality of Russian bureaucrats and military trainers are also raising fears among the Russian pro-
war crowd that the partial mobilization effort may not succeed. Milbloggers noted that employees of
the military enlistment centers are unmotivated and underpaid, reducing their enthusiasm to adhere
to the envisioned mobilization plan. Milbloggers also pleaded with officers and commanders in charge
of preparing mobilized men for war to train them before deployment.
Challenges and errors in the first days of executing a large-scale and demanding partial
mobilization in the midst of a failing war are not necessarily surprising, although they
suggest that the Russian military mobilization infrastructure was not better prepared for
a major war than the Russian armed forces themselves. It is nevertheless conceivable that the
Russian Ministry of Defense will address some of the worst problems and get the mobilization effort on
track. It is also possible, moreover, that much of the partial mobilization is proceeding more or less as
