Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2023
Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and
Frederick W. Kagan
April 14, 8pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by
showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China ahead
of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s visit to Moscow from April 16 to 18. The Russian Ministry
of Defense (MoD) announced on April 14 that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu will meet with Li to
discuss bilateral defense cooperation as well as issues of regional and global security.
1
Chinese Foreign Affairs
Minister Qin Gang stated on April 14 that China will not sell weapons to Russia and will regulate the export of
items to Russia that have dual civilian and military uses.
2
Qin‘s comments represent a continuation of China’s
efforts to rhetorically downplay its support for Russia and demonstrate that there are limits to the ”no limits”
partnership that Russia and China declared before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
3
ISW assessed that Putin
was unable to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he likely hoped for when Chinese
President Xi Jinping visited Moscow from March 20 to 22.
4
The Kremlin is likely hoping to make itself more attractive to China by launching Russian Pacific
Fleet exercises to project Russia’s naval power in the Pacific. The Russian Ministry of Defense
announced on April 14 that the Russian military raised the Pacific Fleet of the Eastern Military District (EMD)
to the highest level of combat readiness for combat readiness checks.
5
Russian Chief of the General Staff, Army
General Valery Gerasimov, also stated that elements of the Pacific Fleet will conduct combat exercises.
6
The
Russian Pacific Fleet’s combat readiness checks are likely meant to signal to China that Russia supports Chinese
security objectives in the Pacific and that Russia remains an equal military partner that can operate as a Pacific
power despite the degradation of Russian military power in Ukraine.
The Kremlin also likely intends to use the Pacific Fleet’s combat readiness checks to attempt to
deter further Japanese support for Ukraine ahead of the G7 meeting from May 19 to 21. Shoigu
stated on April 14 that Russian forces declared that combat readiness checks are intended to work out methods
to prevent enemy forces from deploying in the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk and to repel a landing on the
southern Kuril and Sakhalin islands, both signals to Japan (which claims part of the archipelago that the Soviet
Union seized at the end of World War II).
7
Russia‘s Eastern Military District (EMD) recently deployed a battery
of Bastion coastal defense missile systems to Paramushir Island in the northern portion of the Russian-occupied
Japanese Kuril Islands, which ISW assessed was likely a warning to Japan about further supporting Ukraine.
8
Russia likely intends to use military posturing in the north Pacific to raise fears about military escalation with
Japan in an increased effort to prevent Japan from further supporting Ukraine when it hosts the G7 meeting in
Hiroshima. Russia has employed similar information operations and demonstrative actions against the West
aimed at preventing further Western security assistance to Ukraine by stoking concerns about escalation,
although these efforts have never presaged any real escalation.
9
The Russian military is in no position to threaten Japan at this time. ISW previously reported that
elements of the 40
th
and 155
th
Naval Infantry Brigades of the Pacific Fleet suffered heavy losses near Vuhledar,
Donetsk Oblast in early 2023 and in late 2022, with the 155
th
being reconstituted as many as eight times in the
past year.
10
The Pacific Fleet likely lacks the available combat power in the Pacific region to posture in a way that
would be truly threatening to Japan or suitable for Russia power projection attempts that would be able to
convince China that it is an equal military power.
