1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark
April 6, 4:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Moscow on
April 5 and 6 to discuss further Union State integration, with Putin likely focused on strengthening Russian
economic control over Belarus. Putin and Lukashenko held a one-on-one meeting on April 5 and attended a meeting
of the Supreme State Council of the Union State on April 6 to address Union State integration efforts on security, economic,
defense, cultural, and humanitarian topics.[1] Putin claimed that Russian and Belarusian officials have fulfilled 74 percent
of 28 Union State programs and highlighted the creation of a joint system for indirect taxes, measures to form general
standards for Russian and Belarusian industrial enterprises, and efforts to unify Belarusian and Russian trade
legislation.[2] Putin and Lukashenko both noted that Russian and Belarusian officials are focused on import substitution
measures (likely to mitigate Western sanctions) and supporting microelectronic industries.[3] Putin stated that Russian and
Belarusian officials are continuing the process of creating a joint oil and gas market and are working on drafting an
agreement for the formation of a single electricity market.[4] The Kremlin is likely advancing longstanding efforts to
subsume elements of Belarus’ defense industrial base (DIB), and both states are likely using Union State economic
integration efforts to augment their ongoing sanctions evasion measures.[5] Putin and Lukashenko also likely highlighted
strengthening economic cooperation to support their ongoing efforts to falsely reassure the Russian and Belarusian publics
that Western sanctions regimes will not have long-term consequences.[6]
Putin and Lukashenko also discussed bilateral security issues during their one-on-one meeting and at the Supreme State
Council meeting, but official Kremlin and Belarusian readouts offered little concrete details on these discussions. Putin and
Lukashenko stated that Russian and Belarusian officials began work on a Security Concept for the Union State, but offered
no details for what the joint security document would include.[7] Lukashenko stated that a single joint Russian–Belarusian
regional air defense system is already operating, likely referring to the recent deployment of Russian S-400 air defense
systems to Belarus.[8] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 6 that Lukashenko and Putin did not discuss
the placement of Russian strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus following Putin’s March 25 announcement that Russia will
deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.[9]
Lukashenko delivered boilerplate rhetoric that continues to indicate that he has no intention of involving
Belarus further in Russia’s war effort. Lukashenko stated that NATO is conducting a purposeful buildup of forces
along the borders of the Union State and that the West has unleashed an informational, political, and economic war against
Belarus and Russia.[10] Lukashenko has previously employed such rhetoric in an attempt to justify resisting Kremlin
pressure to further support the Russian war effort in Ukraine by arguing that Belarus needs to protect the western flank of
the Union State.[11] ISW has written at length about why Lukashenko is extraordinarily unlikely to further involve Belarus
in the war in Ukraine.[12] ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko is increasingly losing maneuvering room with the
Kremlin amid the Kremlin’s steady pressure campaign to formalize the Russian-Belarusian Union State, and Lukashenko
may be acquiescing to further integration measures while rejecting Putin’s likely larger demand for the direct participation
of Belarusian forces in Russia’s war against Ukraine.[13]
Russian commanders are reportedly constructing specialized company-size units within key frontline
formations engaged in urban combat to reinforce the diminished combat effectiveness of most Russian
units. A reliable Ukrainian reserve officer released a reportedly captured document on April 6 detailing the recruitment of
personnel (who receive the status of BARS reservists) to form new “Storm Z” companies within elements of the 8th
Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) and the 1st Army Corps, the armed forces of the Donetsk People’s
Republic.[14] Each “Storm Z” company is created outside of conventional army unit structure and apparently is formed of
newly recruited reservists and attached in some manner to existing Russian regiments and brigades, rather than adding
additional assets or providing specialized training to existing frontline companies. It is unclear at this time how these “Storm
Z” units fit into Russian command structures at the battalion level and above and why Russian units are forming new
companies, continuing a standing Russian tendency throughout the war in Ukraine to break down doctrinal unit structures.
Each company is comprised of 100 personnel, broken into four capture squads (10 personnel each), four fire support squads
(10 personnel each), a 2-person company command element, a 5-person combat engineering group, an 8-person
