1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 20, 2023
Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and
Frederick W. Kagan
March 20, 6:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Russian forces made marginal gains in and around Bakhmut amid a reported increase in the tempo of
Russian operations around Avdiivka. Russian forces likely made additional gains in southwestern and northern
Bakhmut as well as northwest of Bakhmut between Bohdanivka and Khromove as of March 20.[1] The Ukrainian General
Staff reported on March 19 that Russian troops attacked toward Berdychi (10km northwest of Avdiivka), which indicates
that Russian forces likely advanced west of Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka) and captured Stepove (just west of
Krasnohorivka).[2] Russian forces are likely increasing the tempo of operations north of Avdiivka in an effort to set
conditions for the encirclement of the settlement and are reportedly employing a greater number of aviation units in the
area to support these operations.[3] Avdiivka Mayor Vitaly Barabash told AFP News on March 20 that Russian forces are
increasingly using Kh-59, Kh-101, Kh-555, and S-300 missiles in the Avdiivka area.[4] A Ukrainian military spokesperson
stated on March 20 that Russian forces have lost about three unspecified companies (likely referring to infantry) in assaults
on Avdiivka since March 19.[5] ISW previously reported that this increased tempo of Russian operations in the Avdiivka
area has reportedly led to major losses and is likely a misguided effort to pull Ukrainian forces away from other areas of the
front.[6] ISW has not observed Russian forces arraying substantial combat power along the outskirts of Donetsk City, and
it is unlikely that Russian forces will be able to sustain this temporary increased tempo. ISW assesses that the overall Russian
spring offensive is likely approaching culmination, and Russian forces may be intensifying efforts to make even marginal
gains before they lose the initiative in Ukraine.[7] It remains possible that Russian advances could prompt Ukraine to
withdraw from Bakhmut and/or Avdiivka although neither appears likely at this time.
Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on March 20 and
offered a more reserved vision for Russian-Chinese relations than what Putin was likely seeking. Xi and
Putin touted the strength of Chinese-Russian relations in their meeting on March 20, but offered differing interpretations
of the scale of future relations in articles they published on March 19.[8] Putin published an article in Chinese state media
in which he argued that Russia and China are building a partnership for the formation of a multipolar world order in the
face of the collective West’s seeking of domination and the United States pursuing a policy of dual containment against
China and Russia.[9] Xi offered a less aggressive overarching goal for Russian-Chinese relations in his article published in
Russian state media outlet Rossiskaya Gazeta, in which he noted that Russia and China are generally pursuing a multipolar
world order but not specifically against an adversarial West.[10] Xi instead focused heavily on presenting China as a viable
third-party mediator to the war in Ukraine whose plan for negotiations ”reflects the unity of views of the world community
on overcoming the Ukrainian crisis.”[11] Putin wrote that Russia welcomes China’s willingness to ”play a constructive role
in crisis management” regarding the war in Ukraine, but Putin likely was hoping for Xi to adopt a similarly aggressive
rhetorical line against the West.[12]
Xi’s refusal to explicitly align China with Russia in Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West is a notable
departure from China’s declared “no limits partnership” with Russia preceding the start of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine.[13] Xi’s rhetoric suggests that he is not inclined to fully give Russia the economic and political support that Russia
needs to reverse setbacks in Ukraine. Putin and Xi offered somewhat similar visions for increased Chinese-Russian
economic partnership, and it is likely that the two will sign bilateral trade and economic agreements during Xi’s visit, some
of which will likely aim to facilitate schemes for sanctions evasion.[14] Xi will also likely offer a more concrete proposal for
a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine, although it remains unclear what his proposal will entail and how receptive
the Kremlin will be to it. The prospects of China supplying Russia with military equipment also remain unclear.
Putin is likely increasing his attempts to rhetorically rally the rest of the world against the West, although
it remains unlikely that he will achieve decisive effects through this effort. Putin attended the International
Parliamentary Conference “Russia-Africa in a Multipolar World” on March 20 and stated that Russia and states in Africa,
Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America uphold the norms of social principles, morality, and traditions and oppose neo-
colonial ideology.[15] Putin’s depiction of an envisioned Chinese-Russian axis against the West and his comments at the
conference likely amount to an intensified proposal to non-aligned countries to form a defined anti-Western bloc. Putin
likely hoped that Xi would offer a similar vision to augment this proposal, and Xi’s refusal to do so likely weakens the impacts
