Institute for the Study of War and
AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2023
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Mason Clark
March 7, 8:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by
showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 7 that the hypothetical Russian
capture of Bakhmut would provide Russian forces an “open road” to Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and
other critical settlements in Donetsk Oblast.
ISW continues to assess, however, that Russian forces lack the capability to exploit the tactical
capture of Bakhmut to generate operational effects, and will likely rapidly culminate following
the capture of Bakhmut. As ISW has previously assessed, Russian forces would have to choose between two
diverging lines of advance after capturing Bakhmut. Russian forces could attempt to push west along the T0504
highway towards Kostiatynivka (about 20km from Bakhmut) or could push northwest along the E40 highway
towards the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area in northwestern Donetsk Oblast (about 40km northwest of Bakhmut).
These two potential axes of advance are not mutually supporting, and degraded Russian forces would likely have
to prioritize the pursuit of just one to have any chance of success - though Russian commanders have repeatedly
stretched their forces too thin across multiple axes of advance throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian
forces have also heavily fortified both of these routes, which are supplied by numerous ground lines of
communication (GLOCs) running deep into the Ukrainian rear, and any Russian attempt to advance down these
roads would likely be highly costly.
Russian forces additionally likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to advance beyond
Bakhmut, and the tactical “assault detachments” used in assaults against Bakhmut are likely
unable to conduct maneuver warfare. Recent Russian advances within urban areas of Bakhmut
demonstrate that Russian forces can secure limited tactical gains with infantry-led frontal assaults.
Russian
forces likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to exploit the roads (which are likely highly fortified) west of
Bakhmut. As ISW has recently reported, Russian forces are increasingly relying on “assault detachments,” a
battalion-size element optimized for frontal assaults on fortified areas, rather than for maneuver warfare.
These
detachments are artillery-heavy, use simplified tactics, relegate tanks to a fire support role in rear areas, and
would almost certainly struggle to effectively conduct operations beyond urban areas. A prominent Russian
milblogger echoed this observation on March 7, noting that assault detachments are simply too small to “punch
a wide and deep gap” in Ukrainian defensive formations and follow with tank and mechanized battalions, and
called for the formation of “breakthrough brigades,” a change likely far beyond the current capabilities of Russian
forces in the area.
The continuing devolution of Russian force structure towards small assault
detachments using simplified tactics, combined with mounting losses among the most effective
Russian troops, will likely greatly limit the ability of Russian forces to properly exploit any paths
of advance opened by the capture of Bakhmut Russian forces remain unlikely to secure more
than a tactical victory following 10 months of assaults.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric seeking to deter further
Western military aid to Ukraine during a conference call on March 7.
Shoigu reiterated senior
Russian officials’ tired claims that Western states aim to destroy Russia by providing arms to Ukraine and have
