Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan
February 26, 9:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, February 26. This report focuses on
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to avoid ordering involuntary mobilization by
launching a series of irregular volunteer force generation campaigns since late May 2022 and the
consequences of that attempt. Putin sought to satisfy the requirement for replacements
following Russian defeats around Kyiv by conducting a voluntary recruitment campaign building
on the existing campaigns already being conducted by quasi-official ultranationalist groups such
as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) or the Wagner Group. Putin
unsuccessfully attempted to establish new all-volunteer formations over the summer that
competed with other existing quasi-official formations. Putin eventually abandoned his
volunteer recruitment campaign after Ukrainian forces liberated much of Kharkiv Oblast
between September 6 and September 11, ordering partial reserve mobilization on September 21.
Russia likely began to run out of combat-ready forces by late May 2022, forcing Russian
President Vladimir Putin to decide between launching a volunteer recruitment campaign or
ordering an unpopular involuntary reserve call-up. ISW observed several indicators that suggested that
the Russian military command had begun to suffer significant manpower shortages in May 2022. Russian forces
began withdrawing from their positions immediately around Kharkiv City in mid-May, and ISW assessed that
Russian forces had abandoned their offensive on the Izyum-Slovyansk line in favor of concentrating forces for
the seizure of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk.
The inability of Russian forces to pursue offensives on both
Severodonetsk-Lysychansk and Slovyansk simultaneously reflected serious limitations in Russian combat
power. Russian veteran communities apparently came to the same conclusion and called on Putin and the
Russian MoD to immediately declare partial mobilization while improving the mobilization call-up system for
subsequent mobilization waves in May 2022.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had likely advised Putin
that he needed to declare mobilization as soon as possible to ensure that Russia had sufficient combat power to
continue offensive operations past the capture of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line.
Putin likely rejected the Russian military’s advice to order an involuntary reserve call-up because
of the unpopularity of the move, the fact that he had not set informational conditions for it, and
possibly also because of his growing distrust of the Russian MoD, which had overseen such
spectacular failures in the war to date.
Putin decided instead to double down on existing volunteer
recruitment efforts already being conducted by ultranationalist groups and ordered the formation of new
volunteer formations. Putin signaled this decision by removing the upper age limits for contract service on May
28, 2022, which would expand the pool of volunteers (although not in a way that would generate many volunteers
suitable for frontline combat).
Putin also removed the planners and the executors of his invasion plan – Chief
of Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu – from the public eye, prompting
many to speculate that both had been fired or demoted.
Putin began to interact directly with the Russian
ultranationalist milblogger community that was spearheading the voluntary recruitment campaign – even
holding an official meeting with milbloggers on June 17.
Milbloggers had been increasingly criticizing the
Russian MoD for failing to achieve significant victories while taking heavy losses and for their repeated military
failures, likely voicing similar complaints to Putin.
Putin and his mouthpieces continued to push a narrative that
the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine was a limited campaign that would not affect the general
Russian public, setting informational conditions to preclude rather than facilitate involuntary mobilization.
