1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko and Mason Clark
February 5, 9pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, February 5. This report focuses on
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cautious approach to risk-taking after having thrown the dice
on launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, an act he likely did not see
as a risk. Putin’s hesitant wartime decision making demonstrates his desire to avoid risky
decisions that could threaten his rule or international escalation—despite the fact his maximalist
and unrealistic objective, the full conquest of Ukraine, likely requires the assumption of further
risk to have any hope of success.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decisions regarding Ukraine since his initial flawed invasion
on February 24, 2022, indicate a likely disconnect between his maximalist objectives and his
willingness to take the likely high-risk decisions necessary to achieve them. Putin likely operated
under the flawed assumption that Russian forces could force Kyiv to capitulate without any significant military
sacrifices and saw Russia’s invasion as a limited and acceptable risk. Captured Russian military plans, for
example, revealed that the Kremlin expected Russian forces to capture Kyiv in days, Russian intelligence services
reportedly expected the Ukrainian military to collapse, and Kremlin propagandists preemptively published a
prewritten article extolling Russia’s “victory” on February 26, 2022.
1
Reports that Putin dismissed the Russian
Central Bank’s prescient warnings in February 2022 of the effect of a war in Ukraine on the future of the Russian
economy under harsh Western sanctions likely suggest Putin wrongfully assumed the West would not impose
major costs on his invasion.
2
The failure of Russian forces in the Battle of Kyiv—and with it the Kremlin’s war
plan—forced Putin to face complex decisions as the Kremlin fought an increasingly costly and protracted
conventional war. Putin, however, has remained reluctant to order the difficult changes to the Russian military
and society that are likely necessary to salvage his war.
Putin has consistently ignored, delayed, or only partially implemented several likely necessary
pragmatic decisions concerning his invasion. Putin was reluctant to order full mobilization following the
costly capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in June-July 2022 and several unsuccessful offensives that
depleted much of his conventional military. Putin ignored repeated calls from the Russian nationalist community
in May 2022 to mobilize reservists, declare war on Ukraine, implement martial law in Russia, and modernize the
military call-up system.
3
Putin likely feared antagonizing Russian society and instead prioritized recruiting and
committing relatively ineffective irregular armed formations over the summer.
4
Putin also attempted to maintain
the façade of a limited war to shield much of Russian society from the scale and cost of the Russian war in
Ukraine.
5
Putin also did not make many public appearances relating to the war effort from the start of the war
until mid-December.
6
Putin additionally did not attempt to silence the large group of Russian pro-war and ultra-
nationalist milbloggers and public figures who supported Putin's war aims but began to criticize what they
perceived as a half-hearted Russian war effort.
7
Putin continued to select comparatively less risky options even when faced with spiraling
military failures in fall 2022. Putin only began to accept domestically unpopular—and potentially risky—
policies such as the declaration of partial mobilization or the expansion of martial law far after the dire situation
on the front lines following Ukrainian successes made clear the Kremlin required additional combat power.
8
Putin could have announced a larger mobilization effort than the reported 300,000 servicemen but likely feared
that the already unpopular prospect of mobilization would further damage his appeal within Russian society.
Putin additionally made a significant rhetorical effort to downplay mobilization by defining it as the mobilization
