Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s
Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W.
Kagan
February 2, 7:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
A Ukrainian intelligence official stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the
Russian military to capture Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by March 2023, supporting ISW’s most
likely course of action assessment (MLCOA) for a Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Chernyak told the Kyiv Post on February 1
that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military to capture all of Donetsk and Luhansk
oblasts by March 2023.
Chernyak also stated that Russian forces are redeploying additional unspecified assault
groups, units, weapons, and military equipment to unspecified areas of eastern Ukraine, likely in the Luhansk
Oblast area.
Russian authorities blocked internet cell service in occupied Luhansk Oblast likely as part of an
effort to intensify operational security to conceal new Russian force deployments in Luhansk
Oblast. The only mobile cell service provider in Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast reported on February 2 that
it would suspend mobile internet coverage in Luhansk Oblast starting on February 11 on orders from the Russian
Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media.
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported
that Russian officials already disabled mobile internet in occupied Luhansk Oblast as of February 2.
Ukrainian
citizens have used cell phones to collect information about Russian forces in occupied Ukraine and send targeting
information to the Ukrainian military.
Russian forces may be learning from their previous operational security
failures and adapting to protect Russian force concentrations in Luhansk Oblast ahead of the major offensive
about which Ukrainian officials are increasingly warning.
Putin may have overestimated the Russian military’s own capabilities again, as ISW previously
assessed.
ISW has not observed any evidence that Russian forces have restored sufficient combat power to
defeat Ukraine’s forces in eastern Ukraine and capture over 11,300 square kilometers of unoccupied Donetsk
Oblast (over 42 percent of Donetsk Oblast’s total area) before March as Putin reportedly ordered. ISW previously
assessed that a major Russian offensive before April 2023 would likely prematurely culminate during the April
spring rain season (if not before) before achieving operationally significant effects.
Russian forces’ culmination
could then generate favorable conditions for Ukrainian forces to exploit in their own late spring or summer 2023
counteroffensive after incorporating Western tank deliveries.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov supported ISW’s MLCOA assessment and possibly
suggested that Russian forces have mobilized substantially more personnel for an imminent
offensive. Reznikov stated on February 2 that Russian forces are preparing to launch an offensive, likely in
eastern or southern Ukraine.
Reznikov stated that Ukrainian officials estimate that the number of mobilized
Russian personnel is higher than the Kremlin’s official 300,000 figure.
Reznikov stated that the Kremlin
mobilized 500,000 Russian soldiers, although it is unclear whether this figure refers to Russian force generation
efforts following the start of partial mobilization in September of 2022 or the total number of forces that Russia
has committed to the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo
Budanov stated on January 31 that there are currently 326,000 Russian forces fighting in Ukraine, excluding the
150,000 mobilized personnel still at training grounds.
The total 476,000 personnel could be representative of
Reznikov‘s figure, or the 500,000 figure could reflect an assessment that ongoing Russian crypto-mobilization
efforts since the end of the first mobilization wave have generated a substantial number of additional forces. ISW
