1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W.
Kagan
February 1, 7:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian officials are continuing to warn about Russia’s intention of conducting a decisive offensive
operation in Donbas in February and/or March, supporting ISW’s most likely course of action assessment
(MLCOA). Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Representative Andriy Yusov stated on February 1 that
Ukraine is on the eve of an active phase of combat that will take place over the next two months.[1] Yusov noted that the
poor state of Russian military equipment will force the Russian military command to mass forces to outnumber Ukrainian
defenders in order to make gains. Ukrainian Colonel Serhiy Hrabskyi stated that Russia does not have sufficient forces to
conduct an attack along the entire 1,500km frontline in Ukraine and will concentrate its efforts on seizing Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts.[2] A prominent Russian milblogger observed that the prospect of a Russian offensive operation does not
appear to be triggering panic among Ukrainian forces, who are continuing to build out their counteroffensive plans.[3] ISW
reported on January 31 that Ukrainian military officials reiterated their intent to launch major counteroffensive operations
by summer 2023.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting conditions for further Russian cross-border raids into
northeastern areas of Ukraine, likely in an effort to further domestic information operations and pin
Ukrainian forces against northern border areas. Putin held a meeting on February 1 to discuss the restoration of
residential infrastructure in Crimea, Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts following “shelling by Neo-Nazi
formations.”[5] Putin noted that his administration is prioritizing the ending of Ukrainian shelling of border regions, but
that this task is “the business of the military department.”[6] Putin’s focus on the supposed danger of Ukrainian shelling of
border regions likely serves a two-fold purpose. It furthers an information operation intended to frame the war in Ukraine
as an existential threat to Russian citizens in order to generate domestic support for a protracted war. ISW has reported on
previous methods by which Russian authorities have engaged in this information operation.[7] Putin may also be setting
conditions for escalated cross-border raids in order to distract and disperse Ukrainian forces from critical axes of advance
by pinning them to northeastern border areas. ISW continues to assess that a Russian invasion from Belarus is exceedingly
unlikely, and the ongoing information operation to pin Ukrainian troops against the northern Ukraine-Belarus border seems
to be faltering as Ukrainian officials increasingly assess that this contingency is improbable.[8] The threat of cross-border
raids from Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts into northern and northeastern Ukraine is likely an attempt to force
Ukraine to deploy limited elements to these areas to protect against such attacks, thus dispersing Ukrainian troops to an
extent in advance of a likely Russian offensive operation in the coming months. ISW has previously reported similar Russian
distraction and dispersion operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[9]
The Kremlin is likely seizing an opportunity to discredit Igor Girkin, a prominent critical voice within the
Russian nationalist space and former Russian officer, following his altercation with Wagner Group
financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov accused Girkin of cowardice following his
decision to retreat from Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast, in July 2014.[10] This is a common criticism Girkin’s enemies direct at
him. Solovyov’s remarks echo Prigozhin’s ongoing efforts to attack Girkin across the Russian information space, which ISW
assessed was an attempt to undermine Girkin’s patronage networks and influence among Russian
ultranationalists.[11] Wagner-affiliated milbloggers also portray Girkin as a coward through shared interviews with
individuals claiming to be Girkin’s acquaintances.[12] ISW previously assessed that Prigozhin’s criticism of Girkin will likely
benefit the Kremlin, who will seize this opportunity to discredit an avid critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[13]
Key Takeaways
• Ukrainian officials are continuing to warn about Russia’s intention of conducting a decisive
offensive operation in Donbas in February and/or March, supporting ISW’s most likely course
of action assessment (MLCOA).
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may be setting conditions for further Russian cross-border
raids into northeastern areas of Ukraine, likely in an effort to further domestic information
operations and pin Ukrainian forces against northern border areas.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast and southwest of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions on the Svatove-
Kreminna line on February 1.
