俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年1月31日

VIP文档

ID:63900

阅读量:0

大小:3.38 MB

页数:20页

时间:2023-06-20

金币:2

上传者:神经蛙1号
1 Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard,
Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 31, 8:15 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The introduction of Russian conventional forces to the Bakhmut frontline has offset the
culmination of the Wagner Group’s offensive and retained the initiative for Russian
operations around the city. The ISW December 27 forecast that the Russian offensive against
Bakhmut was culminating was inaccurate.
1
The Wagner Group offensive culminated, as ISW assessed
on January 28, but the Russian command has committed sufficient conventional Russian forces to the
effort to reinvigorate it, thus forestalling the overall culmination of the offensive on Bakhmut, which
continues.
2
The commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in Bakhmut, Denys Yarolavskyi, confirmed
that "super qualified" Russian conventional military troops are now reinforcing Wagner Group private
military company (PMC) assault units in an ongoing effort to encircle Bakhmut.
3
Another Ukrainian
Bakhmut frontline commander, Volodymyr Nazarenko, also confirmed ISW’s observations that the
Russian military command committed Russian airborne troops to the Bakhmut offensive.
4
Russian
forces are continuing to conduct offensive operations northeast and southwest of Bakhmut and have
secured limited territorial gains since capturing Soledar on January 12.
5
ISW does not forecast the imminent fall of Bakhmut to Russian forces, although the
Ukrainian command may choose to withdraw rather than risk unacceptable losses. It is
extraordinarily unlikely that Russian forces will be able to conduct a surprise encirclement of Ukrainian
forces in Bakhmut. Yaroslavskyi noted that the Ukrainian military command would conduct a
controlled withdrawal of forces from Bakhmut to save Ukrainian soldiers’ lives, likely if the Ukrainian
command assesses that the risk of an encirclement of the city is imminent.
6
Ukrainian Eastern
Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Cherevaty stated on January 31 that Ukrainian forces are still
able to effectively supply units in Bakhmut and noted that the Ukrainian military command has
developed several contingency plans to respond to Russian operations around Bakhmut.
7
Cherevaty
added that Russian forces are continuing to suffer heavy casualties and noted that Ukraine’s previous
defense and subsequent withdrawal from Severodonetsk and Lysychansk over the summer of 2022
exhausted Russian forces and disrupted their plans for an immediate attack on Bakhmut.
Russian officials are again overestimating Russian military capabilities to advance in
Donetsk Oblast and in the theater in a short period of time. Head of the Donetsk People’s
Republic Denis Pushilin stated on January 31 that the Russian capture of Bakhmut will allow Russia to
advance to Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, both approximately 40km northwest of Bakhmut.
8
Wagner
Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin previously claimed that the average pace of Russian advance around
Bakhmut was about 100 meters per day, and it took Russian forces eight months to advance from
occupied Popasna in Luhansk Oblast and Svitlodarsk to their current positions in the vicinity of
Bakhmut (distances of 25km and 22km respectively).
9
Pushilin also claimed that the hypothetical
Russian capture of Vuhledar would allow Russian forces to launch offensive operations on Kurakhove,
Marinka, and Pokrovskdespite the inability of Russian forces to capture Marinka since March 17,
2022, when the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) falsely claimed to have seized the settlement.
10
Pushilin had also claimed that Russian forces will seize Avdiivka, but has not provided any explanation
of how Russian forces will break through almost nine years worth of Ukrainian fortifications around
the settlement.
11
Pushilin’s expectations for Russia's hypothetical seizure of Bakhmut further
资源描述:

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文

此文档下载收益归作者所有

当前文档最多预览五页,下载文档查看全文
温馨提示:
1. 部分包含数学公式或PPT动画的文件,查看预览时可能会显示错乱或异常,文件下载后无此问题,请放心下载。
2. 本文档由用户上传,版权归属用户,天天文库负责整理代发布。如果您对本文档版权有争议请及时联系客服。
3. 下载前请仔细阅读文档内容,确认文档内容符合您的需求后进行下载,若出现内容与标题不符可向本站投诉处理。
4. 下载文档时可能由于网络波动等原因无法下载或下载错误,付费完成后未能成功下载的用户请联系客服处理。
关闭