1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2023
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, George Barros,
Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 30, 8:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Western, Ukrainian, and Russian sources continue to indicate that Russia is preparing
for an imminent offensive, supporting ISW’s assessment that an offensive in the coming
months is the most likely course of action (MLCOA).
1
NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg stated
on January 30 that there are no indications that Russia is preparing to negotiate for peace and that all
indicators point to the opposite.
2
Stoltenberg noted that Russia may mobilize upwards of 200,000
personnel and is continuing to acquire weapons and ammunition through increased domestic
production and partnerships with authoritarian states such as Iran and North Korea.
3
Stoltenberg
emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin retains his maximalist goals in Ukraine.
4
Head of
the Council of Reservists of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Ivan Tymochko, relatedly stated that Russian
forces are strengthening their grouping in Donbas as part of an anticipated offensive and noted that
Russian forces will need to launch an offensive due to increasing domestic pressure for victory.
5
Stoltenberg’s and Tymochko’s statements support ISW’s previous forecast that Russian forces are
setting conditions to launch an offensive effort, likely in Luhansk Oblast, in the coming months.
6
Russian milbloggers additionally continued to indicate that the Russian information space is setting
conditions for and anticipating a Russian offensive. Milbloggers amplified a statement made by a
Russian Telegram channel that the current pace and nature of Russian operations indicate that the
main forces of the anticipated offensive and promised breakthrough have not yet “entered the battle.”
7
This statement suggests that Russian milbloggers believe that Russian forces have not yet activated the
elements required for a decisive offensive effort.
8
Russia and Iran continued efforts to deepen economic ties. NOTE: This item appeared
in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s January 30 Iran Crisis Update. Iranian state media
reported that Iran and Russia established direct financial communication channels between Iranian
banks and more than 800 Russian banks on January 29.
9
Iranian Central Bank Deputy Governor
Mohsen Karami announced that Iranian and Russian banks have signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) on financial messaging, effective immediately. Karami added that Iranian banks
abroad were also included in the MoU and would be able to exchange standard banking messages with
Russian banks.
10
Iranian officials and state-affiliated media outlets framed the MoU as a means to
circumvent Western sanctions on Iran and Russia and compared the messaging system to the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), which serves as the world’s largest
financial messaging system.
11
ISW has previously reported on the deepening of economic and military
ties between Tehran and Moscow.
12
Key Takeaways
Western, Ukrainian, and Russian sources continue to indicate that Russia is
preparing for an imminent offensive, supporting ISW’s assessment that an
offensive in the coming months is the most likely course of action (MLCOA).
