1 Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2023
Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard,
Mason Clark, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros
January 29, 8:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 29. This report
focuses on the impact of delays in sending high-end weapons systems to Ukraine on
Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of windows of opportunity throughout this war.
Delays in the provision to Ukraine of Western long-range fires systems, advanced air
defense systems, and tanks have limited Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of
opportunities for larger counter-offensive operations presented by flaws and failures in
Russian military operations. Western discussions of supposed “stalemate” conditions and the
difficulty or impossibility of Ukraine regaining significant portions of the territory Russia seized in 2022
insufficiently account for how Western delays in providing necessary military equipment have
exacerbated those problems. Slow authorization and arrival of aid have not been the only factors
limiting Ukraine’s ability to launch continued large-scale counter-offensive operations. Factors
endogenous to the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian political decision-making have also contributed
to delaying counteroffensives. ISW is not prepared to assess that all Ukrainian military decisions have
been optimal. (ISW does not, in fact, assess Ukrainian military decision-making in these updates at all.
Yet, as historians, we have not observed flawless military decision-making in any war.) But Ukraine
does not have a significant domestic military industry to turn to in the absence of Western support.
Western hesitancy to supply weapons during wartime took insufficient account of the predictable
requirement to shift Ukraine from Soviet to Western systems as soon as the West committed to helping
Ukraine fight off Russia's 2022 invasion.
The military aid provided by the US-led Western coalition has been essential to
Ukraine’s survival, and this report’s critiques illustrate the importance of that aid as
well as its limitations. Western military advising before the February 24 invasion helped the
Ukrainian military resist the initial Russian invasion. Western weapons systems such as the Javelin
anti-tank missile helped Ukraine defeat that onslaught and throw the Russian drive on Kyiv back to
its starting points. The provision of essential Soviet-era weapons systems and munitions by members
of the Western coalition has kept the Ukrainian military operating throughout the war. The delivery of
more advanced Western systems such as the US-produced 155mm artillery (in April) and then
HIMARS (in June) facilitated the Ukrainian counter-offensives that liberated most of Kharkiv Oblast
and then western Kherson Oblast.
The war has unfolded so far in three major periods. The Russians had the initiative and
were on the offensive from February 24 through July 3, 2022, whereupon their attacks
culminated. The Ukrainians seized the initiative and began large-scale
counteroffensives in August, continuing through the liberation of western Kherson
Oblast on November 11. Ukraine has been unable to initiate a new major counter-
offensive since then, allowing the conflict to settle into positional warfare and allowing
the Russians the opportunity to regain the initiative if they choose and to raise the bar
