Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 25, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Layne Philipson, Grace Mappes, and
Frederick W. Kagan
January 25, 9:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces may be engaging in limited spoiling attacks across most of the frontline
in Ukraine in order to disperse and distract Ukrainian forces and set conditions to
launch a decisive offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces have re-initiated
offensive operations, namely limited ground attacks, on two main sectors of the front in the past few
days—in central Zaporizhia Oblast along Kamianske-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala Tokmachka line and in the
Vuhledar area of western Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian officials have noted that these attacks are
conducted by small squad-sized assault groups of 10 to 15 people and are aimed at dispersing Ukrainian
defensive lines.
The size and nature of these attacks suggest that they are more likely spoiling attacks
that seek to distract and pin Ukrainian forces against discrete areas of the front than a concerted effort
to relaunch offensive operations to gain ground in the central Zaporizhia and western Donetsk
directions.
These limited attacks are notably ongoing as the pace of Russian operations around Bakhmut, led by
the Wagner Group, seems to be decreasing. Following the Russian capture of Soledar in mid-January,
the attacks on Bakhmut and surrounding settlements have apparently dropped off, suggesting that the
Russian offensive operation to take Bakhmut may be culminating. The Wagner Group has failed to
deliver on its promise of securing Bakhmut and has been unable to progress beyond minor tactical gains
in Soledar and other surrounding small settlements. Russian military leadership may have, therefore,
decided to de-prioritize operations around Bakhmut after recognizing the low likelihood that Wagner
will actually be able to take the settlement. As ISW has previously suggested, Russian sources may be
pushing the narratives of claimed Russian offensive operations in central Zaporizhia and western
Donetsk Oblast in order to inflate the Russian information space with positive narratives that
compensate for abject failures around Bakhmut.
Both the information space effects and the attacks
themselves may be intended to distract focus from the lack of gains in Bakhmut and draw Ukrainian
forces to the areas in question.
The Russian military appears to be shifting its focus towards conventional forces and
away from the non-traditional force structure of the Wagner Group, potentially in
preparation for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast. On the strategic level, certain changes to
Russian command reflect a gradual transition away from reliance on unconventional force groupings
such as Wagner and towards supporting and empowering conventional Russian elements. The recent
appointment of Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov to overall theater command
of Russian forces in Ukraine (and subsequent demotion of Wagner Group favorite Army General Sergey
Surovikin) suggests that Russian military leadership is increasingly looking to the traditional and
conventional military establishment that Gerasimov represents and leads. The Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) has similarly engaged in efforts to reform and standardize the conventional military in
line with Gerasimov’s appointment.
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be empowering
Gerasimov to take steps that undermine Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the
