Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 21, 2023
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 21, 7:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut is likely a strategically sound effort despite its costs
for Ukraine. While the costs associated with Ukraine’s continued defense of Bakhmut are significant
and likely include opportunity costs related to potential Ukrainian counter-offensive operations
elsewhere, Ukraine would also have paid a significant price for allowing Russian troops to take Bakhmut
easily. Bakhmut itself is not operationally or strategically significant but had Russian troops taken it
relatively rapidly and cheaply they could have hoped to expand operations in ways that could have
forced Ukraine to construct hasty defensive positions in less favorable terrain. One must also not
dismiss the seemingly “political” calculus of committing to the defense of Bakhmut lightly—Russian
forces occupy more than 100,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory including multiple
Ukrainian cities and are inflicting atrocities on Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas. It is not
unreasonable for political and military leaders to weigh these factors in determining whether to hold or
cede particular population concentrations. Americans have not had to make such choices since 1865
and should not be quick to scorn considerations that would be very real to them were American cities
facing such threats.
Ukrainian forces have previously employed a similar gradual attrition model to compel Russian
operations in certain areas to culminate after months of suffering high personnel and equipment losses
in pursuit of marginal tactical gains. Russian troops spent months attempting to grind through effective
Ukrainian defenses in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the early summer of 2022 and captured
Lysychansk only after a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from the area.
The capture of Lysychansk and
the Luhansk Oblast administrative border, however, quickly proved to be operationally insignificant for
Russian forces, and the ultimate result of the Ukrainian defense of the area was the forced culmination
of the Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast, leading to the overall stagnation of Russian offensive
operations in Donbas in the summer and fall of 2022. Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut will likely
contribute to a similar result—Russian forces have been funneling manpower and equipment into the
area since May 2022 and have yet to achieve any operationally significant advances that seriously
threaten the Ukrainian defense of the area. ISW continues to re-evaluate its assessment that the
Russian offensive on Bakhmut may be culminating but continues to assess that Ukrainian forces are
effectively pinning Russian troops, equipment, and overall operational focus on Bakhmut, thus
inhibiting Russia’s ability to pursue offensives elsewhere in the theater.
The West has contributed to Ukraine’s inability to take advantage of having pinned Russian forces in
Bakhmut by slow-rolling or withholding weapons systems and supplies essential for large-scale
counteroffensive operations.
Milblogger discourse surrounding the reported replacement of Colonel General Mikhail
Teplinsky with Lieutenant General Oleg Makarevich as commander of the Russian
Airborne Forces (VDV) has further emphasized the fracture between two main groups
within the Russian MoD—the pro-Gerasimov camp, comprised of those who represent
the conventional MoD establishment, and milblogger favorites who are less aligned with
