Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
George Barros, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Madison Williams, Layne
Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 19, 8:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map
is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Senior Kremlin officials continue holding high-level meetings with Belarusian
national leadership – activity that could be setting conditions for a Russian attack
against Ukraine from Belarus, although not necessarily and not in the coming
weeks. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin
discussed unspecified bilateral military cooperation, the implementation of unspecified strategic
deterrence measures, and “progress in preparing” the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional
Grouping of Troops (RGV) in a January 19 phone call.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
met Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk and discussed an unspecified Russo-
Belarusian “shared vision” for Russia’s war in Ukraine on January 19.
Lavrov and Belarusian
Foreign Minister Sergey Aleinik discussed how Russia and Belarus can defeat an ongoing Western
hybrid war against the states and signed an unspecified memorandum of cooperation on
“ensuring biological security.”
This memorandum could be a leading indicator of the
intensification of an existing Russian information operation falsely accusing Ukraine of
developing chemical and biochemical weapons in alleged US-funded biolabs in Ukraine that was
part of the Kremlin‘s pretext for the February 2022 invasion.
The most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) of a new Russian attack against
Ukraine from Belarus in early 2023 seems less likely given current Russian military
activity in Belarus. A new MDCOA of an attack from Belarus in late 2023 seems more
likely. Russian forces currently deployed in Belarus are undergoing training rotations and
redeploying to fight in eastern Ukraine.
There are no observed indicators that Russian forces in
Belarus have the command and control structures necessary for the winter or spring 2023 attack
against Ukraine about which Ukrainian issued warnings in late 2022.
It seems more likely that
Russian forces may be setting conditions for a new MDCOA of attacking Ukraine from Belarus in
late 2023 given recent Ukrainian intelligence reports that Russia and Belarus plan to conduct
major exercises (Zapad 2023 and Union Shield 2023), likely in September 2023.
ISW is thus
adjusting its forecast; the current assessed MDCOA is a Russian attack against Ukraine from
Belarusian territory in late 2023. This is not simply a deferment of the timeframe for the previous
MDCOA. It is an entirely new MDCOA given that it would occur in different circumstances. Russia
will have completed the Autumn 2022 annual conscription cycle and be well into the Spring 2023
cycle, on the one hand, and may well have completed one or more additional reserve call-ups by
Autumn 2023. A delayed timeline for this COA could allow Russia’s military industry to gear up
sufficiently to provide a greater proportion of the necessary materiel for a renewed invasion from
Belarus than Russia can provide this winter. ISW continues to assess that a Russian attack against
Belarus remains a highly unlikely scenario in the forecast cone this winter and unlikely but more
plausible in Autumn 2023.
Russia’s nationalist military bloggers continue to criticize the idea of Russian forces
attacking Ukraine from Belarus. Russian milbloggers continue to react negatively every time
the idea of Russian forces attacking Ukraine from Belarus resurfaces. One milblogger stated that
it is a bad idea for Russia to significantly expand the front from Belarus because Russian forces’
battlefield performance improved after compressing the front following Russia’s withdrawal from
