Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros,
Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 20, 8:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov continues to frame Chechen fighters’
involvement in the war in Ukraine on distinctly religious grounds, thereby building out
his reputation and the reputation of his power base. Kadyrov responded to the recent list of
guidelines for grooming standards in the Russian army and noted that a majority of Chechen fighters
wear beards in accordance with the Sunnah, and additionally claimed that his Chechen fighters have
been responsible for major gains in Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk.
Kadyrov questioned
the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s justifications for these guidelines and said they would
demoralize fighters who are "waging a holy war."
Kadyrov additionally amplified a sermon given by
Chechen theologian Magomed Khitanaev on January 20 that claimed that the "special military
operation" in Ukraine is aimed at eradicating Ukranian "satanism."
Kadyrov has repeatedly justified
Chechen fighters’ involvement in the war on distinctly religious grounds, thus presenting himself as the
protector of Muslim fighters and bridging the gap between Chechen forces and Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s framing of the war on religious and moral grounds.
Kadyrov also notably posted footage on January 20 of a group of Chechen theologians completing their
training at the Russian Special Forces University in Grozny, Chechnya, and noted that over 300 qadis
(magistrates and judges who implement sharia law) and imams are planning to undergo similar
training and deploy into Ukraine.
The fact that Chechen qadis will supposedly be embedded in
Chechen units that deploy to Ukraine is noteworthy—qadis typically serve a judicial role in criminal and
civil matters, and their presence in Ukraine may suggest that Kadyrov intends Chechen forces to serve
a basic governance function in occupied areas. ISW has previously reported on Kadyrov’s efforts to
position himself and his Chechen powerbase as a parallel and complementary structure to the
conventional Russian armed forces.
Kadyrov may hope to use qadis and imams in Ukraine to set social
conditions for the long-term resettlement of Muslim populations from the Caucasus in occupied areas
of Ukraine, although there is no independent evidence of any such plans. ISW has previously reported
on Kadyrov’s efforts to import Chechen elements to Ukraine to fill administrative and law enforcement
roles in occupied territories for similar purposes.
The Wagner Group appears to be struggling to present itself as an effective parallel
military structure, thus increasingly proving to be a parasitic paramilitary entity. Russian
opposition outlet TV Dozdh reported on January 20 that a woman whose husband reportedly died
fighting with Wagner in Ukraine received her husband’s sealed coffin, death certificate, and a medal of
honor and buried what she thought was her husband before finding out that he was alive and in
Ukrainian custody.
TV Dozdh claimed that it has collected many such stories and that Wagner
representatives have essentially intimidated family members into not checking coffins to confirm the
deaths of their relatives.
Moscow Duma deputy Evgeny Stupin relatedly noted appeals he has received
from constituents claiming that once their relatives signed contracts with Wagner and deployed to
Ukraine, they ceased to hear from their relatives entirely.
These reports suggest that Wagner lacks
basic administrative organs to maintain records of individual servicemen and communicate properly
