Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13,
2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Madison Williams, and
Mason Clark
January 13, 8:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 13 that Russian forces seized
Soledar, Donetsk Oblast, on the evening of January 12. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces
can now form a “cauldron” around Bakhmut and threaten Ukrainian supply lines running southwest of Soledar
that support Ukrainian troops in the city.
The Russian MoD notably praised assault and army aviation, missile
and artillery troops, and Russian airborne forces for seizing Soledar, without acknowledging Wagner Group’s
participation in the fighting for the city. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov maintained that the
situation around Soledar is difficult and noted that it is unclear if Russian forces control the settlement at this
time, while other Ukrainian military official reported that Ukrainian forces continued to fight in Soledar during
the night of January 12-13.
Ukrainian forces may still occupy some positions on the northwestern borders of
Soledar but are unlikely to control significant territory within the settlement itself. ISW assessed on January 12
that Russian forces have likely captured Soledar on January 11, but such victory is unlikely to presage an
imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.
The announcement sparked a significant backlash within the Russian information space due to
the Russian MoD’s failure to acknowledge the Wagner Group's participation in the capture of
Soledar. The Russian MoD issued a follow up announcement six hours later recognizing Wagner volunteers
and assault detachments as participants in the Battle for Soledar and noting that the Russian MoD received
numerous inquiries regarding its original commemoration of select Russian forces.
The Russian MoD attempted
to justify their snub of Wagner by claiming that a Russian “heterogeneous grouping of troops” executed a “joint
plan” in the Soledar direction and attributed the assault against residential areas to Wagner forces. Wagner
financier Yevgeny Prigozhin vaguely responded to the Russian MoD’s omission of Wagner, stating that he cannot
comment on the situation and noting that journalists’ questions about the matter expose their concern over
commemorating Wagner’s “heroic capture of Soledar.”
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin staged conditions for such backlash by personally visiting Soledar days prior
to its capture and taking his cadre of Wagner-affiliated milbloggers to commemorate Wagner forces’ daily
advances on Russian social media platforms.
Prigozhin likely attempted to preempt the announcement on
January 12 by accusing unnamed bureaucrats and government officials of “constantly trying to steal victory from
[the] Wagner private military company” and belittling its merits.
Milbloggers independent or affiliated with
Wagner subsequently generated a series of criticisms calling out the Russian MoD for its misrepresentation of
the claimed capture of Soledar.
The Russian MoD’s announcement highlighted the existing conflict between the Wagner Group
and the Russian MoD – a dynamic that which ISW has previously observed and assessed. Several
prominent milbloggers – including those affiliated with the Kremlin – stated that there is an ongoing conflict
between the Russian MoD and Prigozhin behind closed doors and within the information space.
Some noted
that Prigozhin has overpowered the Russian MoD‘s deliberately vague rhetoric, forcing the Russian MoD, and
by extension the Kremlin, to end its long-standing policy of refraining from recognizing Wagner and its war
efforts.
A Kremlin-affiliate milblogger, in turn, claimed that Prigozhin and the Russian MoD are both equally
