1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Mason Clark
January 15, 7:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 15. This report focuses on Russia’s likely
preparation to conduct a decisive strategic action in 2023 intended to end Ukraine’s string of operational
successes and regain the initiative.
The Kremlin is belatedly taking personnel mobilization, reorganization, and industrial actions it
realistically should have before launching its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 invasion and is taking
steps to conduct the “special military operation” as a major conventional war. Russian President Vladimir
Putin began publicly signaling preparations for a protracted war in early December 2022, pledging that Russia will improve
upon the mistakes of its earlier military campaigns and setting conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine.[1] Putin notably
remarked on December 7 that the “special military operation” in Ukraine could be a “lengthy process” and made several
further public appearances throughout December indirectly outlining his goals to: improve the Russian war effort’s
mobilization processes, revitalize Russia’s defense industrial base, centralize the Kremlin’s grip over the Russian
information space, and reinstate the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) authority.[2]
The Kremlin is likely preparing to conduct a decisive strategic action in the next six months intended to
regain the initiative and end Ukraine’s current string of operational successes. Russia has failed to achieve
most of its major operational objectives in Ukraine over the past eleven months. Russian forces failed to capture Kyiv, as
well as Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and to maintain gains in Kharkiv Oblast or hold the strategic city of Kherson. The
Russian air and missile campaign targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure under Army General Sergey Surovikin in late
2022 also failed to generate significant operational effects or demoralize Ukrainian society, as the Kremlin likely intended.
Putin and senior Kremlin officials continue reiterating that Russia has not abandoned its maximalist objectives despite
Russian defeats on the battlefield.[3] While Putin has not changed his objectives for the war, there is emerging evidence that
he is changing fundamental aspects of Russia’s approach to the war by undertaking several new lines of effort.
ISW has observed several Russian lines of effort (LOEs) likely intended to support a decisive action in the
next six months.
LOE 1: The Kremlin is intensifying both near- and long-term force-generation efforts. Putin and the Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced plans to drastically expand the conventional Russian military by forming new
divisions, reinstating pre-2010 military districts in western Russia, and increasing the conscription age — all indicating
Russian intent (though likely not actual capability) to reform the Russian military to conduct large-scale conventional
warfighting.[4] Ukrainian intelligence reported that the Kremlin seeks to raise the number of military personnel to two
million by an unspecified date (from about 1.35 million personnel as of September 2022), while Western intelligence officials
noted that Russian military command is in “serious preparations” for a potential second wave of mobilization.[5] Some
Kremlin officials have begun discussing proposals to expand eligibility protocols for conscription, active mobilization, and
the mobilization reserve, while Russian state structures are attempting to resolve past problems issuing mobilization
summonses.[6] Putin himself signed orders that expanded eligibility for mobilization by allowing the mobilization of
convicts on November 4.[7]
LOE 2: The Russian military is conserving mobilized personnel for future use — an inflection from the
Kremlin’s initial approach of rushing untrained bodies to the front in fall 2022. Putin stated on December 7
that the Russian Armed Forces have not yet committed all mobilized personnel from the first mobilization wave to the
frontlines, likely to take time to train and equip these forces for a later, concentrated use.[8] Conventional Russian forces
(as opposed to the Wagner Group and the DNR/LNR proxy forces) have not conducted major offensive operations and have
mostly maintained defensive positions since the series of successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in summer and fall 2022.
ISW has monitored conventional Russian units regrouping and training in Belarus and in Russia.[9]
LOE 3: Russia is attempting to reinvigorate its defense industrial base (DIB): The Kremlin began placing a
significant emphasis on the resurrection of the Russian DIB in December. Putin has held several senior meetings and visited
defense enterprises throughout the country since December.[10] Putin publicly acknowledged issues with supplies, such as
the lack of reconnaissance drones, and notably demanded that one of his ministers issue state defense procurement
