Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes,
Madison Williams, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark
January 11, 8:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 11 that Chief of the
General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov will take over as theater commander as
part of a major reshuffle of the Russian command structure for the war in Ukraine. The
Russian MoD officially announced Gerasimov as Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces and
named three deputies under Gerasimov’s command: previous theater commander in Ukraine from
October 8 to January 11 Army General Sergei Surovikin, Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces;
Army General Oleg Salyukov, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces; and Colonel General Alexei
Kim, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff.
Surovikin has served as commander of the Aerospace
Forces since October 2017 and commanded the "Southern" group of forces in Ukraine from June to
October 2022, before his appointment as overall theater commander.
Salyukov has served as
commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces since 2014, and Kim has served as Deputy Chief of
the General Staff since September 2022 following several positions in Russian military higher education
institutions.
The Russian MoD’s public announcement of this restructuring framed the change as
necessary to both improve Russian command and control and to intensify Russian
operations in Ukraine. The official MoD readout of the appointment states that these changes were
made in association "with the expansion of the scale of tasks solved in [the special military operation’s]
implementation, the need to organize closer interaction between the services and branches of the
Armed Forces, as well as improving the quality of all types of support and the effectiveness of command
and control."
Putin’s decision to have the Russian MoD publicly announce the changes and their intent,
unlike several previous changes to the Russian command structure that were not officially announced,
indicate the Kremlin intends Gerasimov’s appointment as a major shift—both in actual conduct of the
war, as well as the framing of the Russian MoD’s role. Gerasimov’s appointment and the overall
command restructure are likely in part intended to signal, both internationally and domestically within
Russia, the Kremlin’s dedication to the traditional power structures of the Russian MoD and Putin’s
willingness to fight a long war in Ukraine.
Gerasimov’s appointment as theater commander likely advances two Kremlin efforts: an
attempt to improve Russian command and control for a decisive military effort in 2023,
and a political move to strengthen the Russian MoD against challenges from the Russian
millbloggers and siloviki, such as Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, who have
criticized the Kremlin’s conduct of the war.
Gerasimov’s appointment is likely intended to support an intended decisive Russian
military effort in 2023, likely resumed Russian offensive operations. Putin has repeatedly
demonstrated he misunderstands the capabilities of Russian forces and has not abandoned his
maximalist war aims in Ukraine. Putin may have appointed Gerasimov, the highest-ranking officer in
the Russian military, to succeed a series of theater commanders to oversee a major offensive that
