1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 9, 2023
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark
January 9, 6:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group success in Soledar
to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force. Wagner Group forces claimed to capture
territory within Soledar over the past few days, and many Russian sources have discussed the gains as indicators that
Wagner Group forces may soon encircle Bakhmut.[1] Combat footage widely circulated on social media on January 9 shows
Wagner Group fighters engaging in fierce small arms combat near the city administration building in central
Soledar.[2] Several Russian milbloggers remarked on January 8 and 9 that Wagner Group forces are responsible for block-
by-block advances in Soledar and other critical settlements northeast of Bakhmut, as well as within Bakhmut.[3] Prigozhin
emphasized on January 9 that “exclusively” Wagner Group units are taking ground in Soledar, and noted that Wagner
fighters are currently engaged in “fierce battles for the city administration building.”[4] Prigozhin will continue to use both
confirmed and fabricated Wagner Group success in Soledar and Bakhmut to promote the Wagner Group as the only Russian
force in Ukraine capable of securing tangible gains, as ISW has previously reported.[5]
Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a bill setting conditions for further institutionalized
corruption in Russia through domestic legislative manipulations. Putin submitted a bill to the Russian State
Duma on January 9 denouncing the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and withdrawing Russia
from the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).[6] Putin submitted the bill on the grounds that the Council of Europe
terminated Russia’s GRECO membership, thus removing Russia’s ability to vote but requiring them to cooperate on several
obligations.[7] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that this move does not undermine Russian legislative
capacity to fight corruption and emphasized that corruption has not been eradicated anywhere in the world.[8] ISW has
previously reported on Putin’s efforts to institutionalize corruption through various legal manipulations, and Russia’s
discontinued membership in GRECO would likely serve as another means by which Putin can institute legislation
supporting and enabling corrupt practices without facing international legal mechanisms to hold him to account.[9]
Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness of the
Russian information space to accept increased censorship of opposition voices in a Telegram message on
January 8. Medvedev posted a message on Telegram on January 8 which he framed as a response to discussions in the
Russian information space about “traitors who have gone over to the enemy.” Medvedev stated that a serious conversation
began “between the bosses” (likely in reference to Russian leadership) on whether to respond with rule of law or with
justice.[10] Medvedev noted that “quiet groups of impeccably inconspicuous people” operated in Russia to enforce “special
rules of wartime” during World War II with great success, likely alluding to internal censorship.[11] Some Russian
milbloggers appeared to understand Medvedev’s implied censorship and agreed, noting that Soviet security and
counterintelligence organizations were highly effective at censorship and that “ideological people” are willing to assist these
efforts.[12] Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin have recently intensified efforts to silence Russian
milbloggers who criticize the Russian government, as ISW has previously reported.[13]
Key Takeaways
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to use reports of Wagner Group success
in Soledar to bolster the Wagner Group’s reputation as an effective fighting force.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to open the door for further institutionalized
corruption in Russian through domestic legislative manipulations.
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev likely gauged the willingness
of the Russian information space for the censorship of figures deemed as pro-Ukrainian
sympathizers, garnering some acceptance from the nationalist milblogger community.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna
line.
• Ukrainian partisans may be targeting Russian critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs)
in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast frontline and made gains
around Soledar and Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued to reinforce positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
