1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2023
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark
January 8, 3:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, January 8. This report discusses the Russian
Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) attempts to claim that Russian forces responded to the December 31
Ukrainian strike on Russian positions in Makiivka; the Russian MoD’s use of a grievance-and-retaliation
framework and the resulting creation of negative feedback loops in the pro-war Russian information
space; Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s potential attempts to financially exploit Ukrainian
natural resources around Bakhmut; and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense’s (UK MoD) assessment
that Russian forces may be preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensive actions along the Zaporizhia and
Luhansk oblast frontlines.
The Russian MoD’s attempts to claim Russian forces responded to the December 31 Ukrainian strike
against Russian positions in Makiivka are generating further discontent in the Russian information
space. The Russian MoD announced on January 8 that Russian forces conducted a “retaliation operation” against
Ukrainian forces for the December 31 strike on Makiivka that killed up to 400 mobilized soldiers due to Russian command
failures and poor personnel dispersal practices.[1] The Russian MoD falsely claimed the retaliatory strike targeted several
temporary Ukrainian deployment points in Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, and killed over 600 Ukrainian personnel.[2] This
claim is false — a Finnish reporter visited the site of the strike in Kramatorsk on January 8 and noted that it hit an empty
school.[3] Several Russian milbloggers responded negatively to the Russian MoD’s claim, pointing out that the Russian MoD
frequently presents fraudulent claims and criticizing Russian military leadership for fabricating a story to “retaliate” for the
Makiivka strike instead of holding Russian leadership responsible for the losses accountable.[4]
The Russian MoD application of a grievance-and-retaliation framework to many of its operations has
created a negative feedback loop with prominent members of the pro-war Russian information space. At
the beginning of the massive campaign of strikes against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in October 2022, the Russian MoD
employed a similar framing of “retaliation” against claimed Ukrainian strikes on the Kerch Strait Bridge and other Russian
infrastructure.[5] The Russian MoD partially used this framing to mollify escalated demands from the pro-war community
to “avenge” Ukrainian actions but provoked an array of responses from milbloggers outlining other instances that the
Russian MoD should equally “retaliate” for.[6] The Russian MoD has thus created a negative feedback loop, wherein it
attempts to respond to Ukrainian offensive successes with a discrete, retaliatory, offensive action, which then opens the
MoD up to continued criticism from discontented Russian milbloggers highlighting their beliefs that the MoD is responding
in the wrong manner or to the wrong event. The Russian MoD’s response to the Makiivka strike is a clear continuation of
this grievance-and-retaliation model that has once again opened Russian military leadership to staunch criticism of their
conduct of the war.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to financially exploit Ukrainian natural
resources around Bakhmut and is using the war in Ukraine to connect his military forces with Russian
regional officials. An unnamed White House official stated on January 5 that the United States believes Prigozhin seeks
to extract salt and gypsum from mines in the Bakhmut area for monetary gain.[7] Prigozhin attempted to justify the
importance of mines around Bakhmut and Soledar (which Russian forces have struggled to capture from Ukrainian
defenders) on January 7, stating that these mines have “unique and historic defenses” that act as a “network of underground
cities.”[8] Prigozhin added that these mines can house personnel and military equipment up to a depth of 80 to 100 meters
and claimed that these mines are stocked with weaponry from World War I. Prigozhin’s statements are likely an attempt to
both explain the slow pace of Wagner’s advances around Bakhmut but may also partially explain his months-long and costly
determination to establish control of the area. A former Russian officer and milblogger criticized Prigozhin and Russian
commanders, stating that everyone knew about the existence of these mines when developing an offensive plan and
dismissed the claim of the presence of historic weapons in the area.[9] The milblogger also noted even if Russian forces and
Wagner troops seize Soledar, Prigozhin and the Russian military will lose strategically due to committing their best forces
to an attritional battle.[10] ISW had previously reported that another Russian silovik, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, is
reportedly attempting to secure business opportunities in occupied Mariupol.[11]
Prigozhin is also continuing to publicly align himself with select Russian governors in an effort to increase his influence and
advance his personal interests in Russia, as opposed to strictly winning the war. Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit
visited the Wagner training facility for the Kursk Oblast People’s Militia on January 8 and reportedly trained alongside
