1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 7, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Madison Williams,
and Frederick W. Kagan
January 7, 5:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Recent Russian gains in Soledar do not portend an imminent encirclement of Bakhmut, contrary
to claims made by Russian sources. Even at the most generous interpretation of Russian milblogger
narratives, which claim that Russian forces are fighting on the outskirts of Razdolivka (about 6km northwest of
Soledar), Russian forces are still far from being within striking distance of an operational encirclement of
Bakhmut.
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In order to effectively cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Bakhmut, Russian
forces would have to establish control of the T0513 Siversk-Bakhmut highway (currently 7km west of the furthest
point of confirmed Russian advances in the Soledar area) and reach the E40 Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway (13km
from the furthest point of confirmed Russian advance in the Soledar area) at least. Considering that the recent
rate of gains in this area has been on the order of a few hundred meters a day, at most, it is highly unlikely that
Russian forces will be successful in cohering a mechanized push towards these GLOCs and move towards
encircling Bakhmut.
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Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut would still have GLOCs available even if the Russians cut the
E40, moreover, making the entire discussion of an encirclement at this point bizarre.
Russia continues to weaponize religion to perpetuate long-standing information operations and
discredit Ukraine. Russian milbloggers responded to footage posted on January 7 of uniformed Ukrainian
servicemen attending Orthodox Christmas services at the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra and decried it as a reprisal and
open war on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).
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Several milbloggers referred to
the footage as evidence that the Lavra has been “captured” by “heretics and schismatics.”
4
The milblogger vitriol
at the footage of Christmas services at the Lavra follows the decision by the Ukrainian government to take back
control of the main cathedral of the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra from the UOC MP and allow the Orthodox Church of
Ukraine (OCU) to hold Orthodox Christmas services at the Lavra on January 7.
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The Russian response to the
Ukrainian government’s decision to transfer control of the Lavra to the OCU exemplifies Moscow’s continued
weaponization of religion in order to frame Ukraine as evil and position Russia as the protector of Orthodox
Christian values, as ISW has previously reported.
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The Ukrainian government has not disrupted the ability of observers to celebrate Orthodox
Christmas in Ukraine. Russian milbloggers falsely presented the legal transfer of the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra
from the UOC MP, which the Ukrainian government maintains has explicit links to the Kremlin and has
provided material and spiritual support to the Russian war in Ukraine, to the OCU as an attack on the ability of
observers of Orthodox tradition to celebrate Christmas. Orthodox services continued through Ukraine,
including in the Kyiv-Perchesk Lavra, throughout the course of the day on January 7.
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The Ukrainian
government position that elements of the UOC MP, from which Kyiv removed control of the Lavra, is
supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued association with the Russian Orthodox Church. In
his speech on Orthodox Christmas, Putin thanked the ROC for its continued support for Russian troops in
Ukraine.
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Ukraine is not suppressing the religious liberties of Orthodox Christians, contrary to the Russian
information operation, and is instead taking the steps it deems necessary to distance Ukrainian cultural
heritage from religious elements it asserts are linked to the Kremlin and its conduct of the war.
Russian forces reportedly continue to deplete their missile arsenal but will likely continue to be
able to threaten Ukrainian critical infrastructure and civilians at scale in the near term. Ukrainian
Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov published an infographic on January 6 detailing that Russian forces have
expended roughly 81 percent of their strategic missile stocks and 19 percent of their tactical missile stocks.
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