1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threat’s Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Fredrick W. Kagan
June 3, 2023, 4:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by
showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1 pm ET on June 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports
in the June 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian officials continue to signal that Ukrainian forces are prepared to start
counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in a June 3 interview with the
Wall Street Journal that Ukraine is ready to launch a counteroffensive.
Zelensky stated that Ukraine “would like
to have certain things, but … can’t wait for months” to start counteroffensive operations.
Ukrainian Deputy
Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 3 that “military plans love silence” and that she will “discuss
something else” in the meantime, likely acknowledging that Ukrainian officials have started to more strictly
enforce a regime of informational silence about operations in preparation for upcoming counteroffensives.
Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated on June 3 that Ukraine has formed all nine brigades
of the “Offensive Guard” and that these formations are ready to take part in hostilities at Zelensky’s and
Ukrainian Commander in Chief General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi’s orders.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin escalated his feud with the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD), likely hoping to draw criticism back to the Russian military leadership and
downplay his ongoing conflict with Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. Prigozhin alleged on
June 2 that representatives of the MoD placed anti-tank mines and other explosive devices along routes that
Wagner forces were using to withdraw from Bakhmut.
Prigozhin asserted that these charges were placed in rear
areas with no Ukrainian activity and that the MoD likely meant for Wagner forces to detonate the explosives in
order to give Wagner a “public flogging.”
Prigozhin also further responded to a concerted attack that Chechen
commanders launched against him on June 1 and stated on June 3 that he and Kadyrov settled the conflict.
Prigozhin claimed that he called Kadyrov on June 1 and the two agreed to let the “whole story” about the conflict
dissipate.
Prigozhin suggested that a group in the Kremlin may have started the conflict between Kadyrov’s
forces and Wagner and insinuated that the Kremlin often plays ”dangerous games” that could destabilize
interethnic relations within Russia.
Kadyrov has yet to publicly address the conflict between Chechen forces and
Wagner.
Prigozhin has not yet responded to Kadyrov or the Chechen commanders who started the attack in an
antagonistic manner typical of his usual approach to responding to critiques.
The claimed private phone call
between Prigozhin and Kadyrov would suggest that Prigozhin is concerned that this typical public response might
further antagonize Kadyrov and Chechen commanders and that Prigozhin is concerned about having another
prominent silovik figure like Kadyrov aligned against him. Prigozhin likely accused the MoD of trying to kill
Wagner forces and the Kremlin of creating the conflict with the Chechen commanders to quickly reorient Russian
discussion back to his usual targets of ire, the Russian military and political leadership. Prigozhin is also likely
aiming to rally pro-war ultranationalist groups, specifically Kadyrov and Chechen commanders, to join him in
criticizing those targets as he has done before.
