1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 24, 2023, 5:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by
showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12 pm ET on May 24. ISW will cover subsequent
reports in the May 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Discussions regarding reported Russian losses in Bakhmut have saturated the pro-war
information space and are drowning out any remaining positive informational effect resulting
from the city’s capture. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed during an interview with Russian
political strategist Konstantin Dolgov on May 23 that Wagner lost 10,000 convict recruits and 10,000 full-time
professional Wagner fighters killed in action over the course of the Battle for Bakhmut.
Prigozhin specifically
noted that Wagner had recruited 50,000 prisoners, 20 percent of whom (10,000) died in fighting for Bakhmut.
Russian milbloggers immediately seized on the reported losses, shifting the overall Russian conversation away
from discussions of the significance of the capture of Bakhmut and amplifying speculation surrounding the
reported losses. The nationalist pro-war faction, exemplified by the views of former Russian officer Igor Girkin,
commented on the massive scale of the reported losses and speculated that real losses may be much higher.
Russian politician Viktor Alksnis simply remarked that the Soviet Army lost far fewer soldiers (15,051) in nine
years in Afghanistan.
Girkin stated that he believes that Wagner’s actual losses could be more than 1.5 times
higher than Prigozhin’s claims and pointed out that of the 50,000 recruits Wagner received from prisons, 10,000
died in action and 26,000 reportedly received pardons and returned to Russia, leaving 14,000 prison recruits
unaccounted for.
Girkin suggested that a large portion of these 14,000 unaccounted-for prison recruits may
have also been killed in action and claimed that Wagner has likely suffered more than 40,000 killed in action.
Girkin suggested that Prigozhin “keep [his] mouth shut” and stop talking about “wild losses for a very
insignificant result.”
Another Russian milblogger, by contrast, praised Prigozhin for being open about the scale
of losses and stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would have hidden such figures.
The overall Russian information space response to the capture of Bakhmut has fixated on
attributing responsibility for its capture and speculating on the associated costs of the operation,
thus depriving the Russian MoD of the oxygen necessary to positively frame the city’s capture. As
ISW reported on May 22 factions within the pro-war information space immediately began arguing over whether
Wagner or regular Russian units and commanders should receive medals and commendations for operations in
Bakhmut.
Prigozhin’s claims about Wagner’s losses in Bakhmut have similarly become a distinct point of
tension in the information space and have come to define the predominant discourse about Russia’s entire
campaign in Bakhmut. In shifting the conversation towards claimed Wagner losses, Prigozhin has largely
succeeded in further depriving the Russian MoD of the opportunity to claim informational victory over Bakhmut
and will likely continue to define and lead conversations on Bakhmut going forward but at the cost of highlighting
the huge losses his forces suffered for a negligible gain.
Prigozhin is likely using his heightened profile following the capture of Bakhmut to intensify his
attacks against the Russian military establishment and elites. Prigozhin stated in his May 23 interview
with Dolgov that the Russian military leadership has so far failed to achieve the main objectives of the war in
