1 Instute for the Study of War and AEI’s Crical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2023
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark
June 10, 2023, 6:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 10. ISW will cover
subsequent reports in the June 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the
front on June 10. Russian sources reported Ukrainian activity in Luhansk Oblast near
Bilohorivka.[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that
Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1,400m in unspecified areas of the Bakhmut front, and Russ ian
milbloggers reported Ukrainian advances northwest and northeast of Bakhmut.[2] The Russian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted
localized attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, particularly in the Velyka Novosilka
area.[3] Geolocated footage posted on June 10 additionally indicates that Ukrainian forces in western
Zaporizhia Oblast made localized gains during counterattacks southwest and southeast of Orikhiv,
and Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces in this area are successfully defending
against attempted Ukrainian advances.[4]
Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks
in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
defensive operations in southern Ukraine are relying on three main components: early detection and
destruction of Ukrainian assault formations, massive use of anti-tank weapons, and mining of
territories near Russian defensive positions.[5] The milblogger claimed that minefields have a twofold
effect by initially damaging Ukrainian armored vehicles when they attempt to breakthrough the
minefield and then again when they retreat from the area.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian
forces responded to the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast
following established Russian doctrine, which calls for a first echelon of troops to repel or slow
attacking forces with minefields, fortifications, and strongpoints, and a second echelon of forces to
counterattack against any enemy breakthrough.[7] Russian reporting of Ukrainian assaults in
southern Ukraine in recent days suggests a pattern in which Ukrainian forces conduct limited
breakthroughs and temporarily occupy new positions before Russian forces later recapture or push
Ukrainian forces out of those positions.[8] This tactical pattern indicates that Russian forces have
likely maintained doctrinally sound defensive operations in southern Ukraine, though as ISW
previously reported, defending units of the 58th CAA are likely some of the most effective Russian
units currently deployed in Ukraine.[9]
