1 Instute for the Study of War and AEI’s Crical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 2, 2023
Layne Philipson, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, and Fredrick
W. Kagan
June 2, 2023, 6pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-
terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW
will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on June 2. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the June 3 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to respond
disproportionately to limited raids into Russian territory, likely to project
confidence and competence in the MoD’s ability to respond to perceived
threats. The Russian MoD issued a second update about the June 1 Shebekino,
Belgorod Oblast border raid, largely fixating on the timeliness and scope of the Russian
response to the raid.[1] The MoD claimed that additional Russian Western Military
District (WMD) elements reinforced the border area within an hour of the start of the
raid and conducted heavy air, artillery, and flamethrower strikes against the raiding
units and their reserves. The MoD claimed that over 135 people and 35 vehicles in total
conducted the raids and that various Russian defensive efforts - including small arms
fire and mines - repelled the raids. The MoD later celebrated the commander of an
unspecified motorized rifle battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Nikitin, for leading
the defensive effort, likely to preempt attempts to attribute the “victory” achieved by
Belgorod border defense on Russian Colonel General Alexander Lapin as the
information space did during the May 23 raid.[2] The Russian MoD’s fixation on
portraying Russian forces and the Russian military command as capable defenders of
Russia likely reflects internal and broader information space anxiety over the coming
Ukrainian counteroffensive as well as any reverberating informational impacts from any
failures to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks.
Select Russian milbloggers continue to use the situation in Belgorod Oblast
to criticize Russian leadership while others downplayed the recent raids. A
Wagner-affiliated milblogger stated that the Russian MoD is not treating Belgorod
Oblast like Russian territory and claimed that it is only adding to the list of settlements
affected by Ukrainian shelling.[3] A milblogger called on Russian forces to destroy
increasingly well-equipped Ukrainian forces at their deployment points along the border
and not to lie in their reports about the situation in the area.[4] Some milbloggers stated
that Russian forces have responded well to the raids, which they claim are merely
