1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31, 2023
Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Fredrick W. Kagan
May 31, 2023, 7:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on May 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the
June 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Russian military command has likely ordered Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces to
begin offensive operations in Ukraine following the withdrawal of Wagner Group forces from
Bakhmut. Kadyrov claimed on May 31 that Chechen forces received a new order and assumed responsibility over the
Donetsk Oblast frontline.[1] Kadyrov claimed that Chechen units need to start “active combat activities” and “liberate a
series of settlements.” Kadyrov added that Chechen “Akhmat” Special Forces (Spetsnaz) and the “Sever-Akhmat” Special
Purpose Regiment transferred to the Marinka direction southwest of Donetsk City. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
also claimed that assault detachments of the 5th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps and Akhmat
Spetsnaz conducted offensive operations in the Marinka direction.[2] Kadyrov noted that the Russian military command
ordered Russian, Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard), and Chechen Akhmat forces to begin offensive actions along the
front line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts as well.[3] Kadyrov claimed that these units have already begun tactical
preparations for these offensive actions and claimed that “Akhmat” units’ offensive operations began before Ukrainian
forces launched a counteroffensive. ISW has observed no indications of Chechen offensive operations in Zaporizhia or
Kherson as of this writing.
The claimed return of Chechen forces to offensive operations would break Kadyrovites from a nearly
yearlong hiatus from participating in high-intensity combat operations. Chechen forces have been largely
operating in the rear after participating in the battles for Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk - with the exception of
some offensive activities around Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast.[4] ISW also observed Kadyrov’s forces operating as a police
force in the rear in southern Ukraine and performing localized reconnaissance-in-force operations in Zaporizhia
Oblast.[5] Kadyrov also claimed that 3,300 personnel of the “Sever-Akhmat” Regiment were in Chechnya as of May 8, and
ISW assessed that Kadyrov may have been conserving his forces instead sending them to the frontlines.[6] Chechen units’
limited participation on the frontlines alongside Kadyrov’s heavy emphasis on recruitment may suggest that Kadyrov is
hesitant to commit his forces to grinding offensive operations in Ukraine despite his ultranationalist narratives.[7]
The Kremlin may be attempting to reintroduce Kadyrovites as the main offensive force following the
culmination of Wagner forces and their withdrawal from the frontlines. ISW had previously assessed that
Russian President Vladimir Putin had been attempting to pressure Kadyrov into increasing the role of Chechen fighters in
combat operations since at least Putin's public meeting with Kadyrov on March 13.[8] Kadyrov also claimed on May 20 to
have met with Putin in Pyatigorsk, Stavropol Krai, around the time of Wagner Group’s claimed victory in Bakhmut.[9] The
Kremlin did not publish a readout from this meeting, and Kadyrov claimed that he boasted to Putin that there are seven
Chechen regiments and four battalions operating in Ukraine.[10] Kadyrov later clarified on May 26 that there are 7,000
Chechen personnel in Ukraine.[11] The Russian MoD’s mention of “Akhmat” operations in the Marinka direction a day prior
to Wagner’s initial claimed withdrawal date on June 1 indicates that Putin may have coerced Kadyrov into assuming an
offensive role in the war to compensate for Wagner’s likely culmination.[12] The Kremlin may perceive Chechen units as an
untapped assault force that can restore Russia’s ability to sustain simultaneous offensive efforts on multiple axes of advance.
If Kadyrov’s claims that he has 7,000 troops in Ukraine are close to accurate his forces will not be able to mount multiple
significant offensive operations successfully.
The Kremlin may also be attempting to sever Kadyrov’s relationship with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny
Prigozhin and re-emphasize federal authority over Chechen forces. Prigozhin responded on May 31 to reports of
Chechen forces transferring to occupied Donetsk Oblast, stating that he is confident that Kadyrov’s forces will be successful
in capturing some settlements in the region but emphasized that Kadyrov was not tasked with capturing the entirety of
Donetsk Oblast.[13] Prigozhin also noted that he is not aware of Chechen units’ new positions as this information is secret.
Kadyrov participated in Prigozhin’s blackmail attempt in early May aimed at coercing the Russian MoD to allocate additional
military supplies to Wagner in Bakhmut.[14] Kadyrov claimed that his forces would relieve Wagner forces on May 6 and
even directly asked Putin to authorize the transfer of Chechen forces from other directions to Bakhmut.[15] Putin may have
