1 Instute for the Study of War and AEI’s Crical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 11, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and
Frederick W. Kagan
May 11, 2023, 8pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-
terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW
will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:00 pm ET on May 11. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the May 12 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
Ukrainian forces likely broke through some Russian lines in localized
counterattacks near Bakhmut, prompting responses from Wagner Group
financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD). Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr
Syrskyi stated that Russian forces retreated up to two kilometers behind Russian lines in
unspecified sectors of the Bakhmut front.[1] Syrskyi’s confirmation of Ukrainian gains
prompted a response from Prigozhin, who claimed that Ukrainian forces have started
the counteroffensive and recaptured three kilometers of ground in and around
Bakhmut.[2] The Russian MoD acknowledged the Ukrainian counterattacks
uncharacteristically quickly, claiming that Russian forces repelled eight ground attacks
and three reconnaissance-in-force efforts in the Donetsk direction but denied reports
that Ukrainian forces broke through the Russian defensive lines.[3] Prigozhin’s and the
MoD’s responses are reflective of increased panic in the Russian information space over
speculations about planned Ukrainian counteroffensives and indicate increased concern
among Wagner and Russian MoD leadership as well as reflecting Kremlin guidance to
avoid downplaying Ukrainian successes.[4]
The deployment of low-quality Russian forces on the flanks around
Bakhmut suggests that the Russian MoD has largely abandoned the aim of
encircling a significant number of Ukrainian forces there. The Russian MoD
likely began a broader deprioritization of the Bakhmut effort by January 2023 when the
MoD cut off Wagner Group penal recruitment efforts, which likely prompted Prigozhin
to ramp up the Soledar-Bakhmut effort in January and publicly complain about the lack
of MoD support for his efforts starting in February 2023.[5] The Russian MoD briefly
allocated more resources to the Bakhmut front line in March and April by sending T-90
tanks and Russian Airborne (VDV) forces to the Bakhmut area and assigning mobilized
reservists to Wagner, however.[6] Prigozhin claimed on April 24 that the Russian MoD
only deployed irregular and degraded units to hold Bakhmut’s flanks, and the inability
