Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2023
Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 23, 8:15pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 23. This report
outlines the current Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in Ukraine, assesses the offensive
and defensive capabilities of Russian force groupings along the front, and discusses
major factors that may complicate Russian defensive operations in the event of a
Ukrainian counteroffensive.
This report is based on a number of assumptions about Ukrainian capabilities that ISW
does not, as a matter of policy, attempt to assess or report on. It assumes, in particular, that
Ukraine will be able to conduct a coordinated multi-brigade mechanized offensive operation making
full use of the reported nine brigades being prepared for that operation. That task is daunting and
larger than any offensive effort Ukraine has hitherto attempted (four Ukrainian brigades were
reportedly used in the Kharkiv counter-offensive, for example). It also assumes that Ukraine will have
integrated enough tanks and armored personnel carriers of various sorts into its units to support
extended mechanized maneuver, that Ukrainian mechanized units will have sufficient ammunition of
all sorts including artillery, and that Ukraine will be able to conduct long-range precision strikes with
HIMARS and other similar systems integrated with and supporting maneuver operations as it has
done before. It further assumes that Ukrainian forces will have the mine-clearing and bridging
capabilities needed to move relatively rapidly through prepared defensive positions. ISW sees no
reason to question any of these assumptions given the intensity with which Ukraine has reportedly
been preparing for this operation and the time it has taken to do so, as well as the equipment
reportedly delivered to Ukrainian forces by Western countries. If any significant number of these
assumptions prove invalid, however, then some of the assessments and observations below will also
be invalid, and the Russians’ prospects for holding their lines will be better than presented below.
ISW offers no assessment of or evidence for these assumptions, and thus offers no
specific forecast for the nature, scale, location, duration, or outcome of the upcoming
Ukrainian counter-offensive. Ukraine has attractive options for offensive operations
all along the line, and ISW does not assess that the information presented in this
report or any observations ISW has made below lead obviously to the conclusion that
Ukrainian forces will attack in one area or another.
Russian forces in Ukraine are operating in decentralized and largely degraded
formations throughout the theater, and the current pattern of deployment suggests
