SIRIUS 2020; aop
Aufsatz
Efraim Inbar*
Iran and Israel: The Inevitable War?
https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2020-4007
Abstract: This article reviews the ascendance of Iran
in Middle East politics, the Iranian nuclear program,
and the strategic implications of Iranian aspirations,
which all increase the likelihood of direct armed conflict
between Israel and Iran. It concludes that Iran’s nuclear
and hegemonic ambitions remain uncurbed. Whatever
efforts at “regime change” were made were unsuccessful,
and Iran remains undeterred. Therefore, the likelihood of
direct armed conflict between Israel and Iran is great.
1 Introduction
Iran’s drive for Middle East hegemony and its quest for a
nuclear bomb fuel extremely high threat perceptions in
the region and particularly in Israel.
Furthermore, the
theology of the Islamic Republic of Iran denies a place for
a Jewish state. Its leadership believes that Israel will either
wither away under military pressure or be annihilated
when it is weak and vulnerable.
Iran’s ingrained hostility
reinforces Israel’s perception of an existential threat from
Iran. As Iran’s nuclear and hegemonic ambitions remain
uncurbed, the conditions for a direct armed confrontation
between Iran and Israel are nowadays riper than ever.
2 The Rise of Iran in the Middle
East
Iran has historically been an important player in the
Middle East. It is a large country of more than 80 million
people, endowed with energy riches, and has always been
1.
For fears already by Prime Minister Rabin in the 1990s, see Inbar
1999, 124, 138–40. Rabin even contemplated to whether officially to
designate Iran an “enemy state.” (139); see also Merom 2017.
2Segall 2015.
a regional power. With an imperial past and newfound rev-
olutionary zeal (ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution),
Iran projects power in the region and harbors ambitions to
rule the Middle East and beyond. The fulfillment of such
ambitions has been facilitated by systemic and regional
developments.
The Iranian revolutionary enterprise has benefited
from the Middle East policies of the Bush, Obama and
Trump administrations. American military intervention
in 2003 destroyed the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, a
strong rival of Iran. Furthermore, the US failed to establish
a stable successor government in Iraq capable of keeping
the country united and strong. This undermined the
balance of power in the Persian Gulf. The decision by Pres-
ident Donald Trump to withdraw American troops from
northeast Syria in the spring of 2019 signaled American
intentions to leave the Middle East and improved Iran’s
chances to erect a “Shiite corridor” from Iran via Iraq and
Syria to the Mediterranean Sea.
In addition, much of the Sunni Arab world is in the
throes of a deep socio-political crisis since the advent of
the “Arab Spring” (clearly a misnomer), which has created
dissension and a political vacuum within these states.
Several Arab states have since lost their monopoly over
use of force and have degenerated into civil wars. Syria,
Libya and Yemen are the better-known examples. The
central authority in Somalia, Lebanon, the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and more recently in Iraq have also been
challenged by militias. The sophisticated revolutionary
elite in Iran has capitalized upon the weakness of Arab
states by funding and training Iranian-supported proxies
in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza and Yemen.
The Sunni Arab states are weak and have been terrified
by the advances in the Iranian nuclear program and by
the successes of its proxies. Saudi Arabia failed to contain
Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Egypt survived
the domestic turmoil generated by the “Arab Spring“ but
still faces an Islamic insurgency in the Sinai. Egypt focuses
on literally supplying food to its huge population, which is
critical for maintaining domestic stability. This leaves little
energy to parry the Iranian challenge. Turkey, a strong non-
Arab Sunni state, has preferred to act upon its common
interests with Iran on curbing Saudi influence and on the
Kurdish issue, so far forfeiting its potential to balance
*Contact: Prof. Efraim Inbar is the President of the Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS); E-Mail: einbar@jiss.org.il
