The Crisis of the Gaza Strip: A Way Out
Iran’s Policy on the Gaza Strip
Sima Shine and Anna Catran
For many years Iran has enjoyed close relations with Hamas and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Gaza Strip. For years this backing has taken primarily
the form of military aid – weaponry and know-how for self-manufacturing
and the training of personnel. This was complemented by nancial assistance
(hundreds of millions of dollars annually) and political backing in public
events, in order to place the Palestinian issue on the global agenda.
The anti-Israel stances of Iran and Hamas are apparently a common
denominator of greater weight than their divergent Sunni-Shia orientations,
although this ethnic divide has widened in recent years due to changes in the
regional arena. Indeed, the war in Syria created a signicant rift between Iran
and Hamas, when Hamas decided to leave Damascus, support the Muslim
Brotherhood regime in Egypt, and refused to support Bashar al-Assad, leading
to an extended suspension of relations. Particularly after the fall of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas needs Egyptian good will regarding the Rafah
crossing, closed in recent years, and was compelled not to draw closer to
Iran. This is a bone of contention between the Hamas military wing, which
is eager to resume cooperation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and
Iranian intelligence, and the Hamas political wing, which ascribes much
importance to relations with Sunni Arab states. Against the background of
this internal dispute, Iran and Hamas subsequently worked to repair the
damage between them.
Background: Iran in Gaza
Tehran’s policy on the Gaza Strip is derived from Iran’s desire for regional
hegemony and its consistent drive to assist every regional party opposed
to Israel. In Iran’s view, Israel is a foreign implant in the Middle East and
the Zionist movement is an imperialistic, colonialist element that in effect
