POLICY BRIEF | NOVEMBER 2022
HEZBOLLAH’S DILEMMAS
DANIEL L. BYMAN
1FOREIGN POLICY AT BROOKINGS
Executive Summary
The Lebanese Hezbollah is no longer the same organ-
ization that in 2006 battled the Israeli army to a stand-
still: the group today is more global, but has a weaker
domestic position than in the past. For the last decade,
Hezbollah has focused its formidable energies on help-
ing its longtime ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s
regime in Syria, win the country’s civil war. As that conict
winds down with Assad secure in power, Hezbollah is
pulled in many competing directions. Lebanon itself
is in crisis, with Hezbollah’s own legitimacy declining.
Iran is pushing Hezbollah to be even more expansive,
continuing to help ght Israel and to bolster militant
groups in Iraq, Yemen, and other countries. Hezbollah
retains its enmity towards Israel and remains a dang-
erous threat, but the group appears careful to avoid
activities that might escalate into all-out war. The
United States can put more nancial pressure on
Hezbollah and otherwise attempt to weaken the group,
but the group’s fate will ultimately depend on Lebanese
and regional dynamics, with the group exercising
considerable inuence in Lebanon and the region,
though not necessarily seeking greater conict with
Israel or the United States. Until the Lebanese them-
selves put their own house in order by reducing corrup-
tion, engaging in economic reform, and improving
transparency, there will be limits on how much the
United States can, or should, engage with Lebanon.
In July 2022, the Lebanese Hezbollah sent unmanned
drones to threaten Israel as it attempted to begin
production at Karish gas eld. Israel viewed the drone
ights with alarm and shot them down. Yet for all
the concern, the Hezbollah threat did not stop Israel
and Lebanon – where the group is a powerful polit-
ical player – from negotiating a deal over the eld,
heralded as an important step forward in bilateral
normalization.
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Indeed, despite Hezbollah’s bluster, it
proved willing to allow the deal to move forward and
eventually even praised it, suggesting it might want to
rock the boat but not tip it over.
Although Hezbollah’s blustering over Karish seemed
to suggest the group was ending its decade-long
focus on Syria and returning to menace its historic
enemy, the Lebanese group is no longer the same
organization that in 2006 battled the Israeli army
to a standstill: Hezbollah today is more global, but
has a weaker domestic position than in the past.
For the last decade, the group focused its formi-
dable energies on helping its longtime ally, Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, win the
country’s civil war. As that conict winds down with
Assad secure in power, Hezbollah is pulled in many
competing directions. Lebanon itself is in crisis, with
Hezbollah’s own legitimacy declining. Iran is pushing
Hezbollah to be even more expansive, to continue to
help ght Israel, and to bolster militant groups in Iraq,
Yemen, and other countries.
