CRU Policy Brief
Shades of grey: The evolving links
between the Houthi and Iran
JANUARY 2023
Mona Saif
Introduction
In August 2014, the Ansarullah Movement
–better known as the Houthi
1
– took control
of Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. Their professed
aim was, and remains, to liberate ordinary
Yemenis from oppression and injustice, at least
according to the movement’s leader, Abdulmalik
Al-Houthi. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) took the view that
the Houthi were – and are – better seen as
an extension of Iran’s geopolitical designs to
destabilise theArabian Peninsula and expand
the so-called ‘Shi’a crescent’. Thisview has
1 The Houthi are a religious movement, not a tribe,
originating from Sa’ada, Yemen’s northernmost province.
Over recent decades, their sphere of influence gradually
expanded to cover much of the north of the country.
TheHouthi are Zaydi Shi’a in terms of their religious
beliefs, but constitute only a small minority of the
35percent of the Yemeni population that follows this
creed (informal estimates suggest around 2 per cent).
See: https://fanack.com/yemen/population-of-yemen/
(accessed 22 December 2022).
come to dominate the international framing
of the Yemeni civil war due to Iran’s growing
regional profile after 2011–2012, and despite
Houthi involvement in longer-standing domestic
disputes between Sunni and Shi’a, as well as
homegrown tribal clashes. To counter this threat,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE formed a military
coalition and entered Yemen. But were they right
in equating Houthi activities with Iranian foreign
policy interests?
2
According to Duner (1981), a proxy is a domestic
party forced by a foreign sponsor to intervene
in an internal conflict on its behalf. Clearly, the
Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in this sense.
After all, the Yemeni civil war started in 2011
with the overthrow of President Saleh and
2 My thanks go to Hamidreza Azizi, Nancy Ezzeddine and
Erwin van Veen (all Clingendael) for their contributions
and feedback on this brief.
The Houthi are not an Iranian proxy in the sense of unquestioningly doing Tehran’s bidding,
voluntarily or under pressure. Yet, the movement can be viewed as an informal partner
of Tehran. Their relationship has evolved from a partnership of convenience into a more
strategic one. Despite this evolution, the Houthi have remained autonomous with respect to
their domestic constituencies, political strategy and battlefield operations. For the purpose
of peacemaking in Yemen today, as well as subsequent efforts to maintain any peace, this
suggests that the Houthi should be considered an autonomous, domestically legitimate
(inpart) and capable actor, but that Iran also needs to be consulted behind the scenes due
tothe growth of its relation with the Houthi.
