130 EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN, & AFRICAN AFFAIRS SPRING 2020
JEMEAA - VIEW
How the Israel Defense Forces Might
Confront Hezbollah
Dr. EhuD Eilam
e inevitability of another war between Israel and the Hezbollah terrorist
organization seems nearly certain; however, at present, neither belligerent in this
longstanding feud desires immediate conict.
1
e two sides confronted each
other in Lebanon in the 1980s and in the 1990s, until the Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) withdraw from that country in 2000, concluding a campaign that had come
to be known as the “Israeli Vietnam.” In 2006, war erupted between the two
combatants again, lasting a mere 34 days.
2
at war ended in a draw. Since then,
the two sides have been preparing for another round.
In recent years, the IDF has been adapting to ght hybrid forces such as Hez-
bollah and Hamas, instead of focusing on the militaries of Arab states like Syria
and Egypt. is transformation has been a challenging process, although overall
the risk of state- on- state war is much lower for Israel in comparison with the era
of high intensity wars (1948–1982). Even a coalition of hybrid forces together
with the Syrian military in its current strength does not pose an existential threat
to Israel, in contrast to the danger of an alliance between Arab states from the
1950s to the 1970s. However the IDF still must be ready for major combat.
3
Since 2012, Israel has carried out hundreds of sorties in Syria, aiming to reduce
as much as possible the delivery of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
4
Israel
avoided directly attacking Hezbollah in Lebanon, although some in Israel sup-
port a preemptive strike against the terrorist organization.
5
ere is a low proba-
bility that Israel will conduct a massive surprise oensive against Hezbollah due
to its cost and the uncertainty of the outcome. Despite the military advantages of
capturing Hezbollah o guard, Israel prefers to continue to contain the organiza-
tion. Israel hopes that like another of its enemies, Syria, Hezbollah might also
decline through other means, without confronting this group on the battleeld.
After all, Syria once possessed a quite large and powerful military, which had been
the IDF’s main enemy since the mid-1980s, until the civil war in Syria brought a
sharp decline of the Syrian military. Hezbollah might lose much of its power if its
Iranian patron weakens in the wake of new sanctions imposed upon the rogue
state. Sometimes waiting, while maintaining deterrence, is the best way to handle
a foe. However, there might yet be a war between Israel and Hezbollah, with or
without Iranian instigation.
